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ABSTRACT
Police generally do not need a warrant to search information that we reveal to third parties. This so-called “thirdparty doctrine” is supposed to tell courts when our personal information is no longer private, and therefore not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. In the modern world, the doctrine goes too far, leaving much of our most
intimate information exposed. We have little choice but to trust third-parties like cell companies, internet service
providers, email providers, and the like with most of the data we generate.
The root of the problem is the Supreme Court’s restrictive conception of privacy. As the third-party doctrine shows,
the Court inherently understands privacy to be a type of secrecy. Just as information is no longer secret when told,
the Court thinks that information is no longer private after it is shared. The narrow exception recently recognized
in Carpenter v. United States does little to change this. In response, scholars have tried to invent entirely new
conceptions of privacy or have proposed overruling the third-party doctrine altogether.
There is no need for such drastic and unlikely measures. Anglo-American law already has a suitable alternate
understanding of privacy, refined over a four-hundred-year tradition, that is up to the task. Long before privacy
was important to constitutional law, it was one of the central concepts for the common law of attorney-client
privilege. Importantly, the privilege takes privacy to be a kind of confidentiality, rather than secrecy. Confidences,
unlike secrets, can be shared. As a result, attorney-client communications can remain privileged even after
voluntary disclosure to third parties if appropriate steps were taken to preserve their confidentiality. Conceiving of
privacy as a kind of confidentiality could help soften the bright-line of the third-party doctrine by recognizing when
the presence of third parties like cell companies or email providers truly removes privacy interests, and, as
importantly, when it does not. Without such a development, the third-party doctrine will not survive the
Information Age—or our Fourth Amendment protections will not survive it.
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INTRODUCTION
If you have me, you want to share me. If you share me, you haven’t got me. What
am I?
—Old Riddle1

We generate at least two-and-a-half quintillion bytes of data every day.2
Common sense dictates that much of this information—private photos,
personal documents, geolocation records, communications with friends and
family, etc.—is just the sort of thing that the Fourth Amendment should
presumptively protect.3 It does not. Because most of this information passes
through wires, servers, and satellites that others own, it is beyond the reach
of the Fourth Amendment.4 The need to protect this information from those
with the power to punish was one of the crucial insights of the warrant
requirement.5 When authorities have ready access to our private
information, we lose the open-ended freedom to develop and explore the
diverse personal identities that are the cornerstone of American
individualism and progress.6
1

2

3
4
5

6

See, e.g., Ivan Dimitrijevic, Answer These Riddles and You Will Find the Answers to Life, LIFEHACK,
https://www.lifehack.org/articles/communication/answer-these-riddles-and-you-will-find-theanswers-life.html.
Matthew Wall, Big Data: Are You Ready for Blast-Off?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26383058. This number is almost three years old now; it is
surely much higher today.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment seeks
to secure the ‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (explaining that the purpose
of the warrant requirement is to limit invasions of privacy by law enforcement).
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEILLANCE: A CONVERSATION 28 (2013)
(“[P]rivacy being the realm that is meant to be one’s own domain, the territory of one’s undivided
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Not for the first time, Supreme Court doctrine developed at an earlier
stage of human technology is bungling things today. In the nineteenth
century, Fourth Amendment doctrine centered on preventing unwarranted
physical intrusions by the government.7 With the advent of wired
telecommunications in the twentieth century, the physical intrusion test
regretfully led the Court to bless forty years of unwarranted police wiretaps8
before changing its approach.9
In the present day, the doctrinal holdover is the third-party doctrine.
The current touchstone of Fourth Amendment protection is sensible enough;
it safeguards citizens’ “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy.”10 The
qualification added by the third-party doctrine may itself have made sense
when the Supreme Court announced it decades ago: “[A] person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”11 Today, in the connected world of cellphones, tablets, and
laptops, that information is almost all of it. To make use of these devices, we
have to trust everything passing to or from them to the third parties who
transmit and store our data.12 Under the third-party doctrine, this means

7

8

9

10

11
12

sovereignty, inside which one has the comprehensive and indivisible power to decide ‘what and
who I am’ . . . . ”).
See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974)
(discussing that, traditionally, “searches” included physical entries and intrusions, but did not
include observations without physical intrusion).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). Justices in the dissent saw the danger of
the approach. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The progress of science in furnishing the
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day
be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?”).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that governmental activities of wiretapping
to listen to individual phone calls at a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution).
Id.; City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (holding that a city police officer’s employer
did not violate the Fourth Amendment by reviewing the officer’s cell phone text messages because
the officer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in sending the text messages); New York
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117 (1986) (holding that police officers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by reaching into the defendant’s car to find a VIN number of his automobile because
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in locating the VIN number).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
See DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 24–25 (2017)
(discussing different ways that information is taken from unwitting technology users during the
course of modern life); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 211–12 (2006) (discussing “pervasive,
ubiquitous data collection” and storage in modern society).
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that information has no Fourth Amendment protection.13
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States does little
to change this.14 In Carpenter, the Court was asked whether police need a
search warrant to access hundreds of days of “historical cell phone records
that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”15
The Court left the third-party doctrine intact,16 but created a “narrow”
exception for seven-day blocks of cell-site-derived geolocation data.17 All
other sorts of data, even the same geolocation data in six-day blocks, are
unaffected by the opinion.18
What is needed is a principled way of distinguishing between those cases
where the third-party doctrine makes sense, and those where it does not.
Sometimes it does make sense. It is hard to maintain that the things someone
says loudly to the person seated beside her on a crowded subway are still truly
private.19 But there is an obvious difference when that someone is speaking
in her own home, and the “third party” is a cell company’s algorithm logging
the call.
Others have criticized the privacy gap in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence20 and proposed remedies. Some have called for abandoning
the third-party doctrine as anachronistic.21 That extreme solution risks
abandoning the sensible results of the doctrine and unnecessarily hampering
police investigations where no real privacy interests are at stake.22
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20

21

22

See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46 (holding that phone records may not protected); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that bank records may not be protected); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 93
(2011) (“So does the Fourth Amendment protect you when the Government seeks your Google
search records? Not at all.”). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that compelling internet records that an internet provider produced without obtaining a
warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Id. at 2211–12.
Id. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller . . . .”).
Id.
Id. at 2220–21 (“We do not express a view on matters not before us . . . . Nor do we address other
business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”).
Lee Humphreys, Social Topography in a Wireless Era: The Negotiation of Public and Private Space, 35 J.
TECHNICAL WRITING & COMM. 367, 367 (2005) (“Talking on the phone is usually a private
activity, but it becomes a public activity when using a cellphone in certain spaces.”).
Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth
Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 532 (2013) (discussing
the “gaps” in the constitutional protection provided by the Fourth Amendment).
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142 (2014) (discussing that the thirdparty doctrine’s role in the Fourth Amendment is “anachronistic to serve their purpose of
distinguishing the borders of privacy protection.”).
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 600–01 (2009)
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A different sort of solution would call for reforming the doctrine from the
inside out. Perhaps a new theory of privacy could get judicial buy-in, and lead
to a more sensible third-party doctrine based off it.23 As argued below, the
Supreme Court’s hair-trigger conception of privacy as a kind of secrecy—lost
when shared with someone else—is problematic. A different understanding
of privacy could generate a third-party doctrine with a more discriminating
touch. But before going to the lengths of inventing a new approach to privacy,
we should consider whether there is not another solution, ready-made, and
already a familiar fixture of Anglo-American legal traditions. Not only would
such a solution save a lot of effort, but the creatures of habit who run our
courtrooms would likely be more receptive to it.
This Article approaches the problem by drawing on an area of law that
privacy scholars have too long overlooked—attorney-client privilege.
Embedded in attorney-client privilege jurisprudence is our longest-standing
and richest privacy law tradition. The attorney-client privilege is a commonlaw protection for private communications between an attorney and her
client.24 If protected by the privilege, courts cannot force the attorney or the
client to turn over information, whether to other private parties or to the
government. The crucial element of the privilege is that the communications
must be confidential.25
There is a version of the third-party doctrine at play in attorney-client
privilege too—communications may lose their confidential nature if they are
made in the presence of, or are subsequently disclosed to, third parties. The
important difference is that, depending on the context, there are steps
attorneys and clients can take that will preserve the confidentiality of their
communications. As a general rule, with basic appropriate precautions, the
attorney-client privilege protects information even after disclosure to third
parties like email providers, cell companies, and internet service providers.
Courts applying privilege figured out decades ago what the Supreme
Court still has not—how to treat information as private after it is shared with
third-party service providers. In the early rules and doctrines governing
attorney-client confidences are the tools we need to adapt the Fourth

23
24
25

(advancing that the third-party doctrine is important to maintain balance between police
investigatory efforts and the privacy rights of citizens).
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8–9 (2012) (proposing one such theory).
FED. R. EVID. 501.
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (John T.
McNaughton rev., 1961) (noting requirement that attorney-client communications be “made in
confidence” in order to be privileged).
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Amendment and the third-party doctrine to the modern day. The solution
is practical and readily implemented, without grand shifts in fundamental
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or revisionary theories of privacy.
In the lead-up to Carpenter, the Supreme Court seemed poised to
recognize something like the secrecy/confidentiality distinction. Individual
members of the Court had signaled their discomfort with the third-party
doctrine in separate opinions.26 Judge Stranch, who sat on the Sixth Circuit
panel below, wrote a begrudging concurrence that asked the Supreme Court
to “reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”27
The Carpenter Court nearly hit on a re-conception of the third-party
doctrine. It struggled for a vocabulary to describe situations in which “third
parties [hold] records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”28 Failing to find it, the Court tried a different tactic—an artificial
carve-out for the “rare case[ ]” of seven-day blocks of cell-site location
information—“an entirely different species of business record.”29 As Justice
Kennedy argued in dissent, this distinction has the ad hoc feel of “an
unprincipled and unworkable line between cell-site records on the one hand
and financial and telephonic records on the other.”30
The language the Court needed was the language of confidentiality. With
that in hand, a solution to the third-party problem that does not rely on
unsupportable distinctions between types of business records would have come
into view.31 The Fourth Amendment does not protect some fore-ordained
categories of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” over others.32 Rather, as
the Supreme Court has recognized for the last half century, the Fourth
Amendment protects information in which people have privacy interests.33 As
argued below, modern technology is forcing us to distinguish between types of
26

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))).
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 417
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
Id. at 2222.
Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (“We do not express a view on matters not before us . . . . Nor do we
address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (introducing the reasonable expectations of
privacy test).
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privacy interests that were too easy to conflate not long ago. The interests the
Fourth Amendment should protect are confidentiality, not secrecy.
This Article explores what lessons the law of privilege, and in particular
its understanding of privacy as a type of confidentiality, holds for Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. There are notions of voluntariness, disclosure,
precaution, and fairness at play in the privilege context that have yet to find
their way into the constitutional privacy literature. What is more, these
notions are backed by centuries of jurisprudence and doctrine that could be
imported with little modification into the Fourth Amendment inquiry. This
Article begins (Part I) by laying out the law behind the third-party doctrine
and its problematic conception of privacy as a kind of secrecy. That Part
also discusses Carpenter and some other representative solutions others have
proposed, along with their significant shortcomings. The Article then
detours through an examination of privacy-as-confidentiality in the law of
attorney-client privilege, emphasizing how it relates to third-party disclosures
(Part II). In its main substantive contribution, the Article weaves these two
doctrinal threads together to show how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
would benefit from viewing privacy as a kind of confidentiality (Part III).
This development would allow the third-party doctrine to distinguish more
meaningfully between cases when sharing information with a third party
relinquishes one’s privacy interests, and, as importantly, when it does not. In
the course of discussing the detailed mechanics of a Fourth-Amendment
confidentiality inquiry, the Article considers how it could have played out in
Carpenter v. United States; the Court could have reached the same ruling, but
with firmer theoretical foundation and more helpful guidance to lower courts
who will, after Carpenter, be “kep[t] . . . guessing for years to come.”34
The argument below proceeds in the terms set by the Supreme Court
and most Fourth Amendment scholars. That discussion has been largely
policy- and political-philosophy-oriented, and ahistorical.35 The central
interpretive concept—privacy—is not directly mentioned in the
Constitution. While there is certainly interpretive value that rigorous
originalist or textualist methods could bring to the questions addressed here,
the Article does not consider them. Rather, it seeks to validate the values
recognized by the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It
does this by working within (to the extent possible) the Supreme Court’s

34
35

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552 (1999)
(“The modern interpretation of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is the product of post-framing
developments that the Framers did not anticipate.”).
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present Fourth Amendment conceptual and doctrinal framework.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SECRETS
The Fourth Amendment shields our personal information from scrutiny
by authorities.36 It guarantees our right to be secure in our “persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”37 Its
protection is not absolute, however. Authorities can still access that
information if they have a warrant supported by “probable cause.”38
Furthermore, there is some personal information that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect.39 This division—between unprotected personal information,
personal information subject to a warrant, and personal information
authorities cannot access—is the Constitution’s way of balancing individual
privacy interests and the public interest in investigating misconduct.40 This
Part discusses the concept underlying the line the Supreme Court has drawn
between unprotected and protected information: secrecy.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine
The foundation of Fourth Amendment protection is the people’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in their bodies, spaces, and information.41
Where a search would violate those expectations, the government must first
obtain a warrant, backed by “reasonably trustworthy information” that the
search will turn up evidence of crime.42 There is no certain means of
predicting when and over what someone has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.43 As the phrase suggests, inquiry into reasonable expectations of
36
37
38
39

40

41

42
43

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121–22 (1984) (holding that, with regard to a
police search and seizure of a package containing contraband, “it is well settled that it is
constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that cannot support a
justifiable expectation of privacy”).
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment must
balance an “individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security” with the
government’s “need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order”).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality
opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (holding that the Court will evaluate the “totality
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privacy has both subjective and objective dimensions. To begin, a person
claiming Fourth Amendment protections must have had an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in the information.44 This requires that she believe the
information is and should be private and that she seek to preserve its privacy.45
The second, objective dimension asks whether her subjective expectation is
“one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”46 Neither
dimension seems to be particularly principled in its application. There are
few bright-line tests outside of some core cases, like the presumed privacy of
things within the home.47 In cases beyond the core, the Court usually
channels its often-outdated intuitions about what “people in general” think
about privacy.48 One might expect that sociological data about evolving
notions of privacy would assist the Court’s analysis, especially with respect to
the objective prong of the inquiry. Some Fourth Amendment scholars are
starting to collect such evidence (especially as it pertains to electronic
communications),49 but it has yet to find its way into Court opinions.50
Though the Court’s positive notion of privacy is frustratingly hard to pin
down, the negative limits on what counts as private speak volumes. The
Court has recognized various circumstances in which a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. The “plain view” doctrine, for example,
states that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items or
information that are plainly visible to police conducting an otherwise
legitimate search.51 Similarly, the Court has held that people have no

44
45
46
47

48

49

50

51

of the circumstances” when determining whether conduct breaches a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2013)
(holding that, as a bright-line rule, the use of a device not in public use to search details of a home
that are not otherwise exposed to the public violates the Fourth Amendment).
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“First, we doubt that people in general entertain
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.”). But see Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Politically insulated judges come armed with only
the attorneys’ briefs, a few law clerks, and their own idiosyncratic experiences. They are hardly the
representative group you’d expect (or want) to be making empirical judgments for hundreds of millions
of people. Unsurprisingly, too, judicial judgments often fail to reflect public views.”).
Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and
in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 75 (2016) (discussing findings about the public
perception of technological surveillance and privacy implications on the Fourth Amendment).
See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2035–41
(2011) (arguing against judicial reliance on legal assumptions rather than empirical data in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1987); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133
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reasonable expectation of privacy in things held out to the public, like their
street-side garbage.52 These legal doctrines about what privacy is not begin
to suggest an implicit conception of what the Court thinks privacy is. The
key to privacy seems to be non-exposure, i.e., keeping items and information
hidden from view.
The most constraining doctrinal limit on privacy is also the most
illuminating. According to the third-party doctrine, “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”53 The thought behind the third-party doctrine is that if a
person is willing to share some information with other people, she cannot
have really thought (and society is not prepared to recognize) that it was
really all that private in the first place. In a lot of cases, based on
circumstances and who the third parties are, the third-party doctrine makes
a lot of intuitive sense. For example, the third-party doctrine applies to
business and tax records that a defendant turns over to an accountant whom
she knows has a mandatory duty to report.54
The Supreme Court has affirmed and extended what many had thought
were the outer limits of the third-party doctrine’s logic. These often are cases
where people must rely on third-party service providers for basic aspects of
their shared social and economic lives. There were signs that the third-party
doctrine could undermine Fourth Amendment interests as early as 1976,
when the Court held that a person’s bank records are not subject to the
warrant requirement.55 The bank, after all, is a third party. This holding
stands today, despite widespread recognition in the law that people have
privacy interests in their financial information.56
Similar reasoning in the following century established that phone records
are not protected.57 Bank and phone records represent information in which
it is at least debatable (Supreme Court rulings aside) whether people have a

52
53
54

55
56
57

(1990) (“If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve
any invasion of privacy.”).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“Here, we conclude that respondents exposed
their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that turning over business and tax
records to an accountant who was known to be duty-bound to report information negates a
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the records).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
See Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09
(2012).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (describing how the petitioner, by voluntarily conveying numerical
information to the telephone company, “can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy”).
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reasonable expectation of privacy.58 The third-party doctrine gave the Court
an easy answer that allowed it to ignore difficult implications. Today, it
would apply to email accounts run by Microsoft or Google and to DNA data
from services like 23andMe.59
The Supreme Court does recognize that the third-party doctrine may
not always make sense. In one important limitation, the Court held that
privacy interests survive where, unknown to parties claiming the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, the third party with access to their information
was acting at the direction or encouragement of the government.60 Such
third parties are “instrument of state” who are basically operating like covert
government agents.61 Access by them does not compromise people’s privacy
interests vis-à-vis the government because there is effectively no real third
party. Typical cases involve luggage handlers62 or hotel employees63 who,
prompted by a federal investigator looking on, open customer bags or rooms
to search for narcotics. In these cases, the third party would not have pried
into private information but for the government’s involvement. Allowing
police to circumvent the warrant requirement by engaging their own third
parties would undermine basic Fourth Amendment protections.
The most recent limit on the third-party doctrine came this year in
Carpenter. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the third-party doctrine,64
but was asked how to extend it to cell-site data which “chronicle[s] a person’s
past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.”65 A
58

59
60
61
62

63

64

65

See Miller, 425 U.S. at 446–47, 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement between
majority and dissenting Justices on whether bank records are protected by the Fourth Amendment);
see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 748, 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement between
majority and dissenting Justices on whether phone records are protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing
the troubling breadth of the third-party doctrine).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
See id. (referring to the wife of the defendant as potentially being “an ‘instrument’ or agent of the
state” in a police investigation).
See United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that airport security actions
implicate the Fourth Amendment when security checkpoint personnel are acting pursuant to
federally prescribed regulations and directives).
See United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a search of a hotel room
performed by a hotel employee, while working with the police, amounted to state action implicating
the Fourth Amendment).
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (“We have previously held that ‘a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.’ That remains true
‘even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))).
Id.
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straightforward application of the third-party doctrine would have found no
Fourth Amendment protection since cell-site data is necessarily shared with
third-party cell service providers.66 The Court decided that, “[g]iven the
unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is
held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.”67 It is unclear what, if any, other sort of data shares
that nature—its “uniqueness” suggests the answer may be none.68 Indeed,
after Carpenter, even cell-site location records are excepted from Fourth
Amendment protection by the third-party doctrine so long as they cover less
than seven days of data.69 Given the extreme narrowness of Carpenter’s
exception to the third-party doctrine, it does not impact the analysis below.
The logic and scope of the third-party doctrine suggest something about
the Court’s understanding of privacy. The third-party doctrine says (with
rare exception) that when person A shares something with person B, it is no
longer private. This is the informational logic of secrets.70 Once information
is provided to another person, its secrecy is compromised. The law
recognizes this logic outside of the Fourth Amendment context. State secrets
and trade secrets represent information that must not be shared, on pains of
compromising the protections the law gives them.71 Secrets are fragile and
must be jealously guarded.
The practical impact of the Court’s conception of privacy-as-secrecy was
limited in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the third-party
doctrine was taking off. Social and economic structures were such that, with
some exceptions like phone and bank records, relatively few transactions
were memorialized. People could go about ordinary life interacting with the
third parties they depended on in relative confidence that it did not matter
that their exchanges may not be secret.

66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“I cannot fault the Sixth Circuit for holding that Smith and
Miller extinguish any Katz-based Fourth Amendment interest in third party cell-site data.”).
Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (emphasis altered).
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court does not explain what makes something a
distinct category of information [like cell-site data].”).
Id. at 2217 n.3 (majority opinion).
SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 8–9 (arguing that the Court understands privacy as a form of
secrecy).
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (“Of course, as the term [trade secret]
demands, the knowledge cannot be placed in the public domain and still be retained as a ‘secret’.”);
see also Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1249, 1252, 1293 (2007) (arguing that a survey of state secret cases suggests that disclosure of
information to the public would defeat the privilege).
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Investigation and surveillance were expensive in-person affairs.72
Without the aid of the sort of totalitarian information networks present in
East Germany and the Soviet Union,73 relatively few people could actually
be people of interest. In the United States, there was safety in numbers.
Budgetary and structural limits left plenty of room for most people to transact
with each other, free from any real fear of unreasonable government searches
into their personal lives.
Today is different in several respects. One important development of
the twenty-first century is that third-party service providers have their own
third parties. This is the interconnected world of Facebook and Venmo,
where third-party service providers facilitate most social and economic
transactions. Facebook and Venmo then implicate yet further third parties,
like the cell service providers or ISPs through which we access their services.
Every email we send, every website we visit, every file we store on the cloud,
every credit card we swipe, and every phone call we make utilize several
third-party platforms. As a result, the vast majority of government
information requests to companies like cell carriers are not subject to the
warrant requirement. Just obtaining subpoenas will often suffice,74 and the
process for securing these give your data relatively little protection.75
A second major development is that people now transmit information
about themselves to third-party service providers, even when there is no
obvious human or commercial counterparty. Walking alone on the sidewalk

72

73

74

75

Andy Greenberg, Cell Phones Let Cops Track People for a Thousandth of the Price, Study Finds, FORBES (Jan.
9, 2014, 6:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/01/09/cell-phones-letcops-track-people-for-a-thousandth-of-the-price-study-finds/#7dcd88bf5e2e.
One person out of every sixty-six were government informants in East Germany. JOHN O.
KOEHLER, STASI: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE EAST GERMAN POLICE 9 (1999) (noting that onein-sixty-six East Germans were government informants). The number in the U.S.S.R. may have
been as high as one-in-ten. Compare ROBERT W. STEPHAN, STALIN’S SECRET WAR: SOVIET
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE NAZIS 61 (2003) (noting that the U.S.S.R. may have had
as many as twenty million informants), with Victor P. Petrov, Some Observations on the 1959 Soviet
Census, 18 RUSSIAN REV. 332, 332 (1959) (citing the 1959 Soviet Census which put the population
of the U.S.S.R. at over two-hundred million from 1959 onwards). Other estimates go as low as one
in one hundred. For further information on Soviet information networks, see generally Amir
Weiner & Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Getting to Know You: The Soviet Surveillance System, 1939–57, 13 KRITIKA:
EXPLORATIONS RUSSIAN & EURASIAN HIST. 5 (2012).
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); Letter from John C. Gockley, VicePresident, Legal & Regulatory Affairs of U.S. Cellular to Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senator (Oct. 1,
2013),
available
at
https://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-1209_USCellular_CarrierResponse.pdf.
SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 93. There are some weak statutory protections for email and phone
records, but these are changeable and do not provide the level of security ensured by the Fourth
Amendment. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 128.
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or room to room in their houses, people unwittingly take several third parties
along with them if their phone happens to be in their pocket. Cell service
providers track user location in real time,76 as do the developers of the
phone’s apps—anything from flashlight apps77 to innocuous-seeming games
like Angry Birds and Candy Crush.78 Sitting still while watching cat videos,
researching vinyl siding, or trying to diagnose a rash, there is no obvious sign
of the dozens of third-party marketers and their cookies who could be
watching.79
A third major development is that our social and economic transactions
are meticulously recorded and digitally searchable.80 This all but eliminates
the transaction costs of surveillance that, for much of the history of the thirdparty doctrine, were a practical shield for most personal information.
Advertisers will pay top dollar for insights into people’s preferences, and
third-party service providers have responded in kind. Analysts like Sense
Networks crunch personal cell-location data to make valuable user profiles.81
Companies like Facebook generate user profiles from their own data, which
can include over one thousand pages of text for each active user.82 Other
companies compile data from several service providers to package and sell.
One such company, Acxiom, claims to have 1,500 data points on over

76

77

78

79
80

81

82

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (“Most modern devices, such as
smartphones, tap into the wireless networks several times a minute whenever their signal is on
. . . .”). They are required by law to do this, though, as discussed infra pp. 499–500, there is a profit
motive too.
See Fact Sheet: FCC Wireless 911 Requirements, FCC (Jan. 2001),
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911services/enhanced911/archives/factsheet_requirements_012001.pdf.
Ashley Feinberg, Popular Android Flashlight App Straight-Up Lied About Selling Data, GIZMODO (Dec. 6,
2013, 10:41 AM), http://gizmodo.com/popular-android-flashlight-app-straight-up-lied-about-s1477916270.
Jordan Robertson, Leaked Docs: NSA Uses ‘Candy Crush,’ ‘Angry Birds’ to Spy, SFGATE (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Leaked-docs-NSA-uses-Candy-Crush-Angry5186801.php (last updated Jan. 29, 2014, 5:07 PM).
Fresh Air: Tracking the Companies that Track You Online, NPR (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129298003.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of [cell-site location information] gives
police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable. In the past, attempts to
reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of
recollection.”).
Hiawatha Bray, Cellphone Data Mined to Create Personal Profiles, BOS. GLOBE (July 8, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/07/your-cellphoneyourself/eSvTK1UCqNOE7D4qbAcWPL/story.html.
Olivia Solon, How Much Data Did Facebook Have on One Man? 1,200 Pages of Data in 57 Categories,
WIRED (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/12/start/privacyversus-facebook.
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700,000,000 people.83 It should be unsurprising, then, that former Google
CEO Eric Schmidt could honestly say, “We know where you are. We know
where you’ve been. We can more or less [k]now what you’re thinking
about.”84 Third-party service providers record and compile personal
information on a scale that was not technologically feasible a short while ago.
Some of the customers for this data are state and federal authorities. The
third-party doctrine washes away any scruples about warrants and allows the
government to purchase personal information that would have been
prohibitively expensive to gather just decades ago. Third-party service
providers cultivate lucrative and long-lasting commercial relationships with
government buyers.85 AT&T, for example, charges the government twentyfive dollars per day to track a phone,86 and Sprint charges thirty dollars for a
full month.87 This is a fraction of the cost of traditional surveillance,88 so
police can send cell companies millions of data requests each year.89 Cell
companies have even developed automated web interfaces to keep up with
demand.90 For the federal government alone, intelligence contracts amount
to $56 billion each year.91 As one leading commentator observed, “corporate
and government surveillance interests have converged.”92 It is the thirdparty doctrine that allowed them to.
If third parties are not willing to share customer information with police,
the government often has the option of taking it, again without the need for
a warrant. One common route is the Stored Communications Act, which
83

84

85
86

87
88
89
90
91
92

Adi Kamdar, Data Broker Acxiom Launches Transparency Tool, but Consumers Still Lack Control, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/data-brokeracxiom-launches-transparency-tool-consumers-lack-control.
Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists’, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-written-bylobbyists/63908.
Farhad Manjoo, Acxiom Is Watching You, SALON (Feb. 10, 2004, 8:30 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2004/02/10/acxiom/.
Theodoric Meyer, No Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Get Your Digital Data, PROPUBLICA
(Dec.
4,
2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/no-warrant-no-problem-how-thegovernment-can-still-get-your-digital-data (last updated June 27, 2014, 10:29 AM).
Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of
United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 349 (2014).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (“[C]ell phone tracking is remarkably
easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.”).
Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1.
Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Dec. 1,
2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html.
Tim Shorrock, Opinion, Put the Spies Back Under One Roof, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/opinion/put-the-spies-back-under-one-roof.html.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 29 (2015).
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was at issue in Carpenter.93 Passed in 1986, the Act allows the government to
subpoena telecommunications records upon showing a judge “reasonable
grounds to believe” the records are “relevant and material” to a criminal
investigation.94 Shortly after 9/11, the government acquired further
subpoena powers. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act,95 which
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) by weakening
restrictions on domestic surveillance by the government. Domestic
surveillance is now permitted so long as foreign intelligence gathering is a
“significant purpose;” previously, it had to be “the purpose.”96 The National
Security Agency understands the Act to allow them to send “national security
letters” to corporations demanding the records, files, emails, etc., of their
customers.97 These FISA “requests” generally do not require a warrant;
when they do, the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court seems to
grant them as a matter of course.98 Companies that do not comply with
national security letters face stiff penalties. In one instance, the National
Security Agency threatened Yahoo with a fine of $250,000 per day if it
refused to turn over user data; that figure was set to double every week.99
After just two months, the fine would have been $64 million per day.
As a result of these developments, the third-party doctrine poses a
widespread threat to much of people’s most private information. The next
Section considers various proposals about how Fourth Amendment law
93
94
95
96
97

98

99

Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
§ 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (second emphasis added).
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment
to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 525 (2006) (“[T]he 2001 USA PATRIOT
Act . . . authorized a system of National Security Letters that the FBI has employed with increasing
frequency in a wide variety of situations with only remote connections to the goal of preventing
terrorism.”); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1306, 1332 (2004) (“The Patriot Act significantly expanded the scope of the little-known tool of
‘National Security Letters.’”); see also Russell L. Weaver, Cybersurveillance in a Free Society, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1207, 1237 (2015) (“[W]hen the NSA sends a National Security Letter to a
telecommunications company, it usually includes an order precluding the company from publicly
acknowledging the letters or the disclosures or even from alerting their customers.”).
SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 130; Erika Eichelberger, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent of All Government
Surveillance
Requests,
MOTHER
JONES
(June
10,
2013,
5:30
PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsa-spying-opinion-reject-request;
Colin Schultz, The FISA Court Has Only Denied an NSA Request Once in the Past 5 Years, SMITHSONIAN
(May 1, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/fisa-court-has-only-denied-nsarequest-once-past-5-years-180951313/.
Dominic Rushe, Yahoo $250,000 Daily Fine over NSA Data Refusal Was Set to Double ‘Every Week’,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/yahoonsa-lawsuit-documents-fine-user-data-refusal.
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should adapt.
B. Scholarly Criticism
Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt once remarked: “If you have
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be
doing it in the first place.”100 The concern of the Fourth Amendment is not
to give people space to do things they “shouldn’t be doing.” Rather, the
concern is to allow people to live core areas of their personal lives with the
dignity that excludes onlookers.101 It is to permit people space to do those
unpopular or disfavored things which authorities merely think people
“shouldn’t be doing.” When the government intrudes on this space, it risks
sliding into the sort of totalitarianism that the United States spent forty-five
years resisting. In the words of Justice William O. Douglas:
When an intelligence officer looks over every nonconformist’s shoulder in
the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or infiltrates his club,
the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no
longer is cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed, but more
in the Russian image . . . .102

As Justice Sotomayor has recently observed, Fourth Amendment protections
are also crucial to ensuring the exercise of other constitutional guarantees:
“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms.”103 People share information with third parties all the
time—the colleagues, friends, and corporations they interact with on a daily
basis. That is a social and economic necessity. But when those with the
power to punish have access to that same information, the stakes change.104
The power to punish is the power to suppress messages and identities that
are unpopular or perceived to be threatening. The disfavored messages and
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102
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Google CEO on Privacy (VIDEO): ‘If You Have Something You Don’t Want Anyone to Know, Maybe You
Shouldn’t Be Doing It’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/google-ceo-on-privacy-if_n_383105.html
(last
updated Dec. 6, 2017).
See John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 664, 681
(explaining that while privacy is the overarching rationale behind the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonable searches, “[t]he Court . . . has intermittently cited the protection of
human dignity as a concern under the Fourth Amendment”).
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
ROBERT SCHEER, THEY KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOU: HOW DATA-COLLECTING
CORPORATIONS AND SNOOPING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE DESTROYING DEMOCRACY 14
(2015) (“It is one thing to have a private company mine your data for better leads on shopping or
viewing but quite another for your government to be doing that snooping . . . .”).
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identities of one day are the seeds of social progress for the next.105
Scholars have proposed different ways of resolving the tension between
the Fourth Amendment and the third-party doctrine in the present day. One
solution could be to abandon or severely limit the third-party doctrine.106
However, the Court is unlikely to set aside over forty years of third-party
jurisprudence.107 Not only are judicial habits hard to break, but the thirdparty doctrine often makes sense and has a crucial role to play in keeping us
safe. The Fourth Amendment is a balance of interests between protecting
privacy and providing authorities with the information they need to protect
the public.108 When authorities have less information, they are less able to
prevent crime and its harmful consequences.109 That safety mission should
be compromised only when there are counterbalancing interests that
outweigh those of future victims. The third-party doctrine appropriately
identifies some scenarios where those counterbalancing interests are weak or
non-existent. Sharing something during a loud conversation on the subway
or to hundreds of friends on Facebook suggests that the dignity interests that
may otherwise attach to that information are weak or have been voluntarily
forfeited.110 Similarly, the concerns about chilled speech or association that
Justices Douglas and Sotomayor raised are less immediate for parties who
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See Lyman Abbott, Why Women Do Not Wish the Suffrage, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1903),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1903/09/why-women-do-not-wish-thesuffrage/306616/ (“In 1895 the women of Massachusetts were asked by the state whether they
wished the suffrage. Of the 575,000 voting women in the state, only 22,204 cared for it enough to
deposit in a ballot box an affirmative answer to this question. That is, in round numbers, less than
four per cent wished to vote; about ninety-six per cent were opposed to woman suffrage or
indifferent to it. That this expresses fairly well the average sentiment throughout the country can
hardly be questioned.”).
Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 84 (2011) (“[T]he third-party doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment has come to a breaking point . . . .”); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 268 (2016)
(“[A]pplying the third-party rule in today’s world is inconsistent with the history and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment.”).
A version of the third-party doctrine first entered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 1976. Price,
supra note 106, at 264 (“The ‘third-party doctrine’ originated with two Supreme Court decisions in
the late 1970s, United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.”).
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (balancing the government and privacy
interests in deciding whether to apply the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to arrest exception
to cell phones).
Kerr, supra note 22, at 573.
See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010,
8:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy (explaining
Mark Zuckerberg’s view that people have become comfortable making all sorts of previously private
personal information public).
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feel safe speaking and associating openly.111
A different approach that some scholars prefer would be to patch the
doctrine from the outside by using legislation to require third-party service
providers to be more transparent to consumers about what will and could
happen with their data.112 Europe, for example, has much more demanding
data transparency laws.113 The Department of Commerce runs a program
that registers United States companies as “Safe Harbor Compliant,”
meaning that their data-use policies satisfy European Union requirements.114
More data transparency in the United States would certainly be an
improvement, but it is doubtful that would help with the concerns raised
here. It could educate users about the current legal implications of using
third-party services,115 but for that to make a difference, people need to have
a real alternative to sharing their information. Modern social and economic
realities leave people no choice but to make use of the third-party services
providers that assist their phones, laptops, and watches.116 Those with
111

112

113

114

115

116

See Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RES. CTR. (May 21, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/ (“Teen social media
users do not express a high level of concern about third-party access to their data . . . .”).
See Mary Graw Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth
Amendment Protection in a Post Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 334 (2012) (“This Article
proposes a new legislative framework for respecting privacy protections in response to these
commercial-induced privacy affronts. This framework, supported by analogous American law and
European proposals, calls for an opt-in model: before an individual can be assumed to have
voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he must affirmatively opt in to allow the use of his private data. The
opt-in must, however, be meaningful and not an unfair component of a terms of service agreement.”).
See The OECD Privacy Framework, OECD (2013), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (“Openness Principle . . . There should be a general policy of
openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.”).
See Search the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, EXPORT.GOV, https://www.export.gov/safeharbor_eu (last
visited Feb. 24, 2018); see also Letter from Penny Pritzker, Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equal., European
Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), available at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
media/files/2016/eu_us_privacy_shield_full_text.pdf.pdf; Letter from Edith Ramirez,
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender
Equal., European Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), available at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/
commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu_us_privacy_shield_full_text.pdf.pdf.
Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez & Srikanth Sundaresan, 7 in 10 Smartphone Apps Share Your Data with ThirdParty Services, CONVERSATION (May 29, 2017, 9:48 PM), https://theconversation.com/7-in-10smartphone-apps-share-your-data-with-third-party-services-72404 (“Transparency, education and
strong regulatory frameworks are the key. Users need to know what information about them is
being collected, by whom, and what it’s being used for. Only then can we as a society decide what
privacy protections are appropriate, and put them in place. Our findings, and those of many other
researchers, can help turn the tables and track the trackers themselves.”).
Id.; see also Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the Third
Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2017) [hereinafter If These Walls Could Talk] (“[I]t’s
not clear that our modern consistent conveyance of personal information to third parties is . . .
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sufficient resources117 can pay for premium privacy-protective services that
function without access to customer data—like Riseup118 for email or
SpiderOak119 for cloud storage. But relying on for-pay services risks making
privacy a privilege for the privileged. “[T]he Constitution doesn’t prefer the
rich over the poor . . . .”120
More promising proposals for addressing the overreach of the thirdparty doctrine work from within. One such approach focuses on the notion
of consent.121 The third-party doctrine only applies to information that has
been “voluntarily” turned over to third parties.122 Most third-party service

117

118

119

120
121

122

voluntary . . . . Increasingly, disclosure of such information is necessary to participate in modern
life.”); Ghoshray, supra note 106, at 74–75 (“This voluntary-involuntary distinction falls flat on its
face when confronted with the stark reality that the post-modern individual conducts life through
the enabling means of the Internet and may, indeed, have a fundamental right to Internet access.”).
See, e.g., Matt Sledge, Alex Kozinski, Federal Judge, Would Pay $2,400 a Year, Max, for Privacy,
HUFFINGTON POST (March 4, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/04/
alex-kozinski-privacy_n_2807608.html. See generally JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST
FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE (2014).
See About Us, RISEUP, https://riseup.net/en/about-us (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (“Can you rely on
a corporate email provider for confidentiality of your sensitive email communications? Not only
do they typically scan and record the content of your messages for a wide variety of purposes, they
also concede to the demands of governments that restrict digital freedom and fail to have strict
policies regarding their user’s privacy.”).
See The SpiderOak Collaboration Suite, SPIDEROAK, https://spideroak.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2018)
(“For over 10 years, SpiderOak has built software based on a singular, unwavering belief: that the
world is a better place if software is trustworthy and secure. SpiderOak software allows you to
communicate, collaborate, and organize within the confines of the most restrictive compliance
regulations.”).
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
See Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment from Commercial Conditioning
by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 374 (2013) (“By
reinvigorating voluntariness into the search jurisprudence and the Third Party doctrine, this
proposal suggests only a minor adjustment in current law.”); see also If These Walls Could Talk, supra
note 116, at 1925; Leary, supra note 112, at 334.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to
be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent. As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in
determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such searches and the
equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”); In re Application of the United
States, 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Even if Petitioners had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in IP address information collected by Twitter, Petitioners voluntarily relinquished any
reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine. To access Twitter, Petitioners
had to disclose their IP addresses to third parties. This voluntary disclosure—built directly into the
architecture of the Internet—has significant Fourth Amendment consequences under the thirdparty doctrine, as articulated in United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.”).

Dec. 2018]

PRIVILEGING PRIVACY

505

providers ask users to click “I Agree” to some sort of privacy disclosure.123
But the average person cannot understand the legalese in which these are
usually written.124 Even if she can understand which information she is
sharing, fully appreciating the significance of doing so requires some
background in data science.125 “Anonymous location data” (which many
privacy policies say service providers collect) sounds like it protects a person’s
identity. Yet, as data researchers have shown, it does not—just four
“anonymous” date/location points will identify a person with ninety-five
percent accuracy.126 Are people really consenting to turn over their
information when they do not understand what information that is or the
implications of doing so? Some of the data transparency initiatives discussed
above may help address this consent concern, but, once again, only if people
have alternatives to agreeing to the data policies of the third-party service
providers. The other side of the worry with the consent argument is that it
risks proving too much. If people never really consent when they click “I
Agree,” the third-party doctrine will be severely compromised, and the
ability of authorities to protect us along with it.
A different kind of argument, again working within the framework of the
third-party doctrine, may help rein in the doctrine for some service
123

124

125

126

See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services,
81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,275 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 64) (“We adopt rules
requiring carriers to obtain customers’ opt-in approval for use and sharing of sensitive customer PI
(and for material retroactive changes to carriers’ privacy policies). A familiar example of opt-in
practices appears when a mobile application asks for permission to use geo-location information.”).
See Alex Kozinski & Mihailis E. Diamantis, An Eerie Feeling of Déjà Vu: From Soviet Snitches to Angry Birds,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 425 (David Gray & Stephen E.
Henderson eds., 2017) (“The privacy agreements are written by lawyers and techies, for lawyers
and techies, usually with no effort to make them penetrable to the vast majority of users.”); Umika
Pidaparthy, What You Should Know About iTunes’ 56-Page Legal Terms, CNN (May 6, 2011, 7:08 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/05/06/itunes.terms/index.html (noting the opinion of
technology attorney Mark Grossman that “[m]ost people really just don’t understand digital rights
management”); see also David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of Service, Studies
Confirm, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-fine-print (“Only a quarter of the 543 students even
bothered to look at the fine print. But ‘look’ is not ‘read’: on average, these more careful joiners
spent around a minute with the thousands of words that make up NameDrop’s privacy and service
agreements. And then they all agreed to them.”).
See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 425 (“Suppose you are a lawyer with the extraordinary
patience to read a privacy agreement. You may understand what you’ve agreed to formally. But
unless you know a good deal about big data science, you probably have no idea what you’ve really
agreed to. The app developers, and whomever else they sell your data to, will know the information
you’ve allowed them to collect, but also everything they can infer from aggregating all the
information. Those inferences are the most valuable part.”).
See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility,
NATURE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376.
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providers.127 Recall that the third-party doctrine does not apply when the third
party is an instrument of state, acting with too much direction or
encouragement from the government.128 Courts consider two factors when
determining whether a third party is an instrument of state: 1) the degree of
government involvement, knowledge, and acquiescence, and 2) the intent of
the party conducting the search.129 Some third-party service providers satisfy
these factors quite nicely because the government’s level of involvement,
knowledge, and acquiescence in collecting that data is extremely high.
Consider, for example, cell companies that log user geolocation data. On the
front end, the federal government requires cell companies to do this for 911
emergency response purposes.130 Then, on the back end, the government
purchases the location data the cell companies collect.131 The government is
involved, albeit not directly, throughout the process. This makes cell
companies, at least so far as customer geolocation is concerned, seem a lot like
instruments of state rather than third parties. In other cases, though, the
factors will not so clearly mark a third-party service provider as an instrument
of state. Most will likely fall in the “gray area” of all balancing tests and require
individualized consideration.132 A more sweeping fix would be preferable.
A final approach to fixing the third-party doctrine, and the approach
adopted by this Article, is to ask whether the Supreme Court has an adequate
understanding of “privacy,” the reasonable expectation of which the Fourth
Amendment protects. As argued above, the Supreme Court’s implicit
conception of privacy is as a kind of secrecy. That is the best explanation of
why the third-party doctrine has been given such a long reach—secrets told
to third parties are secrets no more. Other scholars have recognized that
there are different understandings of privacy and that the Court’s is
unnecessarily restrictive.133 Things we share with our spouses, friends, and
doctors are private, even if they are no longer totally secret. What is needed
is an alternate theory.
127

128
129
130
131
132
133

See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 436 (“The infrastructure for a potential surveillance
state is in place, and it is largely in private hands. . . . The third-party doctrine, which currently
gives the government easy access to any information that passes through the private infrastructure,
is dangerously outdated. We . . . suggest[ ] . . . treating many corporations with access to customer
data as instruments of state.”).
See id. at 433.
United Sates v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981).
See Fact Sheet: FCC Wireless 911 Requirements, supra note 76.
See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 424 (“Data brokers make good money when the
government buys data that would cost much more to acquire itself.”).
Walther, 652 F.2d at 791.
See SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 8 (“The idea that privacy means secrecy is too narrow even
when we think only about personal information . . . .”).
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Stephen J. Schulhofer suggests that privacy is about having control over
our information rather than keeping it secret.134 This seems like a step in the
right direction. Schulhofer’s conception of privacy recognizes that people
can share information with third parties in ways that nonetheless maintain
its privacy.135 He argues that his privacy-as-control approach would require
the government to get a warrant for customer data held by service providers
when customers have no realistic alternative but to provide their
information.136 So far so good. But Schulhofer’s proposal is unlikely to get
Supreme Court buy-in. It is an entirely new theory of privacy. While the
Court does sometimes make dramatic pivots in doctrine, it tends to prefer
incremental change built on familiarity.137 Since Schulhofer’s approach has
no precedent in law, its boundaries and implications are difficult to
anticipate. For example, what happens in cases where control and privacy
seem to come apart, as when someone tells everyone but a single frenemy
about an upcoming party? This seems like a situation that involves
meticulous control over information, but no intuitive privacy interest
deserving constitutional protection.
The Court would be more likely to accept a more familiar and welllitigated notion of privacy, with established contours and implications. It is
to this that the Article now turns.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not the only area of law where the
concept of privacy has an important role to play. Tort law recognizes a cause
of action for invasion of privacy.138 Statutory schemes like the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act139 and the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act140 direct custodians of certain private information to
134
135
136
137

138

139

140

Id. at 8–9.
Id.
Id. at 140–42.
See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297 (1996) (discussing the
tendency of courts to rule narrowly with incremental changes to doctrine, as opposed to broadly
with drastic changes to doctrine).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST., 1977) (“One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1177, 110
Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996) (detailing the offense and penalties of wrongful disclosure of individually
identifiable health information).
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1)(L) (2012) (describing the
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prevent outside access. And common law evidentiary privileges protect some
private information from discovery, whether by opposing parties or by the
government.141 It is surprising that Fourth Amendment privacy scholars
have underappreciated these reserves of insight into what privacy is and can
be. Evidentiary privilege should be a particularly appealing resource because
it can serve to protect information from the government, even in the face of
a duly issued search warrant.142 Focusing on attorney-client privilege, this
Part starts to unpack the potential benefits of such doctrinal cross-pollination.
A. Background to the Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorney-client privilege is a common law doctrine that applies in state
and federal courts alike.143 Among common law privileges, it is the oldest.144
It emerged in England nearly five hundred years ago as part of the law of
witnesses.145 The jury trial was just starting to replace outmoded practices
like trial by ordeal or combat,146 which sought to channel divine judgment

141

142

143
144
145

146

importance of an agency caseworker or other representative of a State and local child welfare
agency not disclosing a student’s case plan).
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1950) (“‘[T]he public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that
any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional . . . .’ Every exemption from testifying
or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected. If a privilege based upon
that interest is asserted, its validity must be assessed.” (footnote omitted)); see also Jaffee v. Redmond,
518 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1996) (discussing patient-therapist privilege); Trammel v. United States, 455
U.S. 40, 41–42 (1980) (discussing spousal privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,
384–85 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing confessional privilege).
See United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (D. Me. 2011) (showing that the government
must use a filtering agent to cull out potentially privileged information before reviewing emails
obtained pursuant to a search warrant); Nat’l City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020,
1026 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[A] law office search should be executed with special care to avoid
unnecessary intrusion on attorney-client communications . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATT’Y MANUAL § 9-13.420(E) (“[E]very effort should be made to avoid viewing privileged material
[during a search].”); Eric D. McArthur, The Search and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client
Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 756 (2005) (“[P]rivileged attorney-client communications
cannot be searched and seized.”).
FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by the United States courts in light of reason
and experience—governs a claim of privilege . . . .”).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
1 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2 (2017),
Westlaw; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
5:13, at n.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated June 2018) [hereinafter FEDERAL EVIDENCE]
(citing Berd v. Lovelace (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33; Cary 62; Dennis v. Codrington (1580) 21 Eng.
Rep. 53; Cary 100).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145.
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through harrowing feats.147 Without access to a Judge on high to render
verdicts, courts needed human witnesses to testify about the facts during trial.
Parliament responded by passing the Statute Against Perjury in 1562,148
which enabled courts to compel witnesses to testify. Because the law at the
time did not permit parties to testify in their own cases, litigants instead
sought to compel testimony from their opponents’ lawyers.149 The first
attorney-client privilege cases emerged soon after to address the obvious
problems this dynamic raised.150
The justification common law courts gave for the privilege shifted about
over the centuries. Originally, the stated purpose behind the doctrine was to
protect attorneys’ honor, since they were duty-bound to keep client
confidences.151 As a consequence, courts originally ruled that it was the
attorney rather than the client who held and controlled the privilege.152
Society and attorneys clearly understood that revealing a client’s confidences
would be an act of betrayal153 at which “[e]very feeling of justice, honour and
humanity[ ] would be shocked.”154 Thus, at their core, such “humanistic”
147

148
149
150

151

152
153
154

Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 109, 117 (2000) (“The proofs cited most routinely are the ordeal of the iron, which consisted
of a proband carrying a red-hot iron for a specified distance, and the ordeal of the cauldron, which
required him to pluck an object from boiling water. An affirmative judgment required that the
wound heal cleanly within three days time.” (footnotes omitted) (citing ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL
BY FIRE AND WATER 13–22 (1986); then citing R.S. VAN CAENEGEM, LEGAL HISTORY: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 75–76 (1991))).
See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455 n.9 (1985) (noting
that the Statute Against Perjury imposed a “universal duty” on witnesses to testify when called upon).
See RICE ET AL., supra note 145.
Id.; see also Austen v. Vesey (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 34, 34; Cary 63, 63; Berd v. Lovelace (1577) 21
Eng. Rep. 33, 33; Cary 62, 62 (“Thomas Hawtry, gentleman, was served with a subpoena to testify
his knowledge touching the cause in variance; and made oath that he bath been, and yet is a solicitor
in this suit, and hath received several fees of the defendant; which being informed to the Master of
the Rolls, it is ordered that the said Thomas Hawtry shall not be compelled to be deposed, touching
the same, and that he shall be in no danger of any contempt, touching the not executing of the said
process . . . .”).
See Anonymus (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179, 179–80; Skinner 404, 404 (“In a trial at Nisi Prius in
Westminster, one Saunders an attorney who had drawn an indenture of agreement between a
sheriff and his under-sheriff, being produced to prove a corrupt agreement between them; he was
not compelled to discover the matter of it, though he was not a counsellor; and per Holt Chief
Justice, it seems to be the same law of a scrivener; and he cited a case where upon a covenant to
convey as counsel shall advise, & consilium non dedit advisamentum being pleaded, conveyances
made by the advice of a scrivener being tendred and refused, was allowed to be good evidence upon
this issue; for he is a counsel to a man, with whom he will advise; if he be instructed and educated
in such way of practice, otherwise of a gentleman, parson . . . .”).
Id.
1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE § 2.3, at 169–71 (Richard D. Friedman & Ralph W. Aigler eds., 3d ed. 2017).
EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL
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justifications for the attorney-client privilege sought to prevent attorneys
from becoming “potential adversaries who could be pitted against the people
they seek to serve.”155
During the eighteenth century, the focus shifted from attorneys’ interests
in honor to clients’ interests in effective counsel. As one judge put it:
[T]he interest which [the client] has in this privilege, is very obvious. No
man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without
employing and consulting with an attorney . . . and if he does not fully and
candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may
be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be
impossible for the attorney properly to serve him . . . .156

With this development arose the rule that the clients control the privilege,
and only they (not their attorneys) can waive it. 157
Until the nineteenth century, attorney-client privilege applied to a
relatively limited range of attorney-client communications—those providing
advice in anticipation of litigation.158 In 1833, common law courts removed
this restriction in one of the most important attorney-client privilege cases,
Greenough v. Gaskell.159 The issue in Gaskell was whether a client could claim
the privilege over accounts and letters prepared, dictated, or received by an
attorney “in his character or situation of confidential solicitor to the
[client].”160 The court opined that:
[I]t does not appear that the protection is qualified by any reference to
proceedings pending or in contemplation. If touching matters that come
within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they [attorneys]
receive a communication . . . from a client . . . they are not only justified in
withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be
compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers in any Court of
law or equity, either as party or as witness. If this protection were confined
to cases where proceedings had commenced, the rule would exclude the
most confidential, and it may be the most important of all
communications—those made with a view of being prepared either for

155
156
157
158

159
160

JURISPRUDENCE; CONSISTING OF SYSTEMS OF PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 461 (1873).
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13.
Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1237 (Ex. 1743).
Lord Say & Seal’s Case (1712) 88 Eng. Rep. 617, 617; 10 Mod. 40, 41 (“The Court were of opinion,
that Holbeche’s case was good law; and that an attorney’s privilege was the privilege of his client . . . .”).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, §§ 1:6–9. Some historians have argued that the privilege only extended
to barristers, but a close look at the cases reveals that communications with other attorneys were
also privileged when they were in anticipation of litigation. Barristers were simply the attorneys
whose clients were most likely to communicate with in anticipation of litigation. See id.; Berd v.
Lovelace (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33, 33; Cary 62, 62.
(1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618; 1 My. & K. 98.
Id. at 620.
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instituting or defending a suit, up to the instant that the process of the Court
issued.161

This was the start of the expansive scope of the attorney-client privilege
familiar today. Thus, by 1873, a court could write:
[I]t is not now necessary as it formerly was, for the purpose of obtaining
production, that the communications should be made either during or
relating to an action or even to an expected litigation. It is sufficient if they
pass as professional communications [with an attorney] in a professional
capacity.162

American courts imported this law of attorney-client privilege from
England with very little change.163 First recognized by the Supreme Court
in 1826,164 the privilege has been employed to serve “broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”165 American courts
tended to see the privilege in purely instrumental terms, as an essential
“means to the end of promoting certain desirable social consequences.”166
The privilege helps people stay informed about what the law requires of them
by facilitating full and frank discussion between attorneys and the clients
seeking their advice. A client who cannot be sure that all statements to her
attorney would be safe from discovery and exploitation by an opposing party
may choose not to seek legal advice or not to disclose all important
information.167
That instrumental rationale is still the prevailing justification for the
attorney-client privilege today.168 Although the precise elements of the

161
162
163

164
165
166

167
168

Id.
Lawrence v. Campbell (1859) 62 Eng. Rep. 186, 188; 4 Drewry 485, 490.
See, e.g., Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. 273, 286 (1814) (“[C]ounsel and attornies ought not to be
permitted to give evidence of facts imparted to them, by their clients, when acting in their
professional character; that they are considered as identified with their clients, and, of necessity,
entrusted with their secrets, which, therefore, without a dangerous breach of confidence, cannot be
revealed; that this obligation of secrecy continues always, and is the privilege of the client, and not
of the attorney. The court is also of opinion, that this restriction is not confined to facts disclosed,
in relation to suits actually depending at the time, but extends to all cases in which a client applies,
as aforesaid, to his counsel or attorney, for his aid in the line of his profession.”).
See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826) (“The general rule is not disputed, that confidential
communications between client and attorney, are not to be revealed at any time.”).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 2.4, at 174–75; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[The
privilege’s] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”).
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13.; IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 2.4, at
174–75.
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13.
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attorney-client privilege vary among jurisdictions, Professor Wigmore’s
definition is a common model:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.169

Accordingly, the attorney-client relationship begins when a prospective client
approaches an attorney with the intent of receiving the attorney’s services
and legal advice.170 The privilege attaches to all initial interview
communications before that point, regardless of whether representation is
offered or declined, and then to all confidential communications once the
offer for representation is accepted.171 Thus, as long as a client can provide
sufficient evidence to meet each of the above elements the attorney-client
privilege will apply. Once the relationship is created, the duration of the
privilege is indefinite, even lasting beyond a client’s death, unless it is waived
beforehand.172
B. Confidentiality and Third Parties
Though the attorney-client privilege is often referred to as an “absolute”
privilege, there are conditions in which courts will hold that the privilege,
and its protections, have been waived.173 The focus of the waiver inquiry is
the fourth element in Wigmore’s definition of the privilege—
confidentiality.174 If attorney-client communications lose their confidential
169
170
171
172
173
174

WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 554 (emphasis omitted).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 2:4.
Id.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406–07 (1998).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 2:2.
WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2292, at 554; see IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 6.12.2,
at 1155–56 (discussing that the burden of proof in waiver cases revolves around a privilege holder
showing that the initial communication was confidential and that confidentiality has been
maintained); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“The
confidentiality element and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any voluntary disclosure
inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship waives the privilege.”).
There are other ways clients can waive the privilege that do not implicate confidentiality. For
example, if a client asserts an advice of counsel defense in a criminal trial, or otherwise refers to the
contents of attorney-client communications to disadvantage their opponents. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A defendant may also waive the
privilege by asserting reliance on the advice of counsel as an affirmative defense.” (citing cases)); see
also BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., 81 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: WITNESSES § 329 (2d ed.
2018), Westlaw (“[A] party waives the attorney-client privilege by placing the advice of counsel in
issue only where the client asserts the claim or defense and attempts to prove that claim or defense
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nature, they are no longer privileged.
The confidentiality requirement was an early American addition to the
common law of attorney-client privilege.175 Over the course of the twentieth
century, the confidentiality requirement became the majority rule in U.S.
jurisdictions.176 The private-public interest balancing rationale behind the
development is strikingly similar to the rationale behind the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The interest in encouraging clients
to be forthcoming with their attorneys must be balanced against the interests
adverse parties (including government authorities) have in gathering all
available evidence.177 Clients who are unconcerned about confidentiality do
not need the protections of the privilege to coax them to seek legal advice.178
Consequently, in such cases the balance of interests tips in favor of
evidentiary transparency, and against the privilege.
The standards courts use to measure confidentiality are also structurally
reminiscent of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Recall that the warrant
requirement attaches to information in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as measured by subjective and objective criteria.179
Similarly, for an attorney-client communication to be considered
confidential, the client must subjectively intend that the communications to
the attorney are confidential, and such intent must be objectively reasonable
under the circumstances.180 The communications must be confidential when
first conveyed, and confidentiality must be maintained at all times
afterwards.181

175

176
177
178

179
180

181

by disclosing or describing an attorney-client communication . . . .”). These modes of waiver serve
as practical exceptions to the general rule that confidential attorney communications are privileged,
because any other rule would unfairly allow parties to use the privilege “both as a sword and shield”
against opposing parties. Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 745 F.3d 343,
353 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chevron Corp. v Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, at § 6:3. Early U.S. cases held that attorneys could not be compelled
to testify to non-confidential communications, though third parties aware of the communication
could be. Id. (citing Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829)).
Id.
Charles W. Wolfram, The U.S. Law of Client Confidentiality: Framework for an International Perspective, 15
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 529, 544 (1991).
See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47
DUKE L.J. 853, 859 (1998) (explaining that “the protection of the privilege is not ‘necessary to
secure the client’s subjective freedom of consultation’” when the client freely chooses to
communicate in certain situations, such as when a third party is present (footnote omitted)).
See supra Section I.A.
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 6:1; see, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir.
1988) (“The key, of course, to whether an attorney/client relationship existed is the intent of the
client and whether he reasonably understood the conference to be confidential.” (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (“It is vital to a claim of privilege
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As with privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the concept of
confidentiality in the law of privilege is best defined by its breach. Clients
are said to “waive” the privilege, whether intentionally or not, when they do
something that compromises the confidentiality of the privileged
information. This is where the attorney-client privilege’s version of the thirdparty doctrine comes in. Disclosure of privileged information to a third party
may182 “destroy[] both the communications’ confidentiality and the privilege
that is premised upon it.”183 Courts reason that a client who allows third
parties to overhear or otherwise access communications to her attorney
cannot intend those communications to be confidential.184
Even
unintentional disclosure to a third party may waive the privilege.185
Privilege waiver, however, differs in two crucial respects from the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine that give the former a lighter, more
nuanced touch. To begin, the circle of third parties to whom information
can be revealed without shedding its confidential character is much wider.186
The only parties formally excepted from the third-party doctrine are
instruments of state—a person’s reasonable expectation of Fourth
Amendment privacy is not undermined if the third party is acting at the
direction of the government.187 The law of privilege, however, must be
different—its very existence is premised on the presence of a third party (the
attorney). It recognizes that there are many contexts where communications
with third parties are confidential and many important relationships that
would be undermined if evidentiary privileges did not apply, such as

182

183
184

185

186
187

that the communication have been made and maintained in confidence.”).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 396 (1981) (“[T]he recognition of a privilege based
on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974)).
RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 9:29 (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819
(1984)).
Frank v. Morley’s Estate, 64 N.W. 577, 578 (Mich. 1895) (“The communication was not made in
any confidence which excluded [another individual], . . . and under such circumstances the
privilege does not exist.”).
Compare Dion Messer, To: Client@Workplace.com: Privilege at Risk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. &
PRIVACY L. 75, 93–95 (2004) (discussing cases where inadvertent disclosure resulted in waiver), with
FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (outlining circumstances where inadvertent disclosure in the federal setting
will not result in waiver).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 133 (2006).
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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spousal,188 medical,189 psychiatric,190 and confessional relationships.191 These
relationships form a network of third parties linked by a commitment to
confidentiality; they often require that information be shared between
them.192
A person worrying about past misdeeds may need to tell her attorney
and her priest the same stories. A person’s legal troubles may be the source
of her psychiatric angst. And her spouse may be just as important a source
of support and advice as her attorney during legal conflict. Forcing a waiver
of attorney-client privilege when a client shares attorney-client
communications to third parties in these relationships would undermine not
only the value those relationships offer, but also the attorney-client
relationship.193 The law recognizes this fact and does not hold that disclosure
of attorney-client communications to one’s spouse, doctor, psychiatrist, or
priest undermines confidentiality.194

188

189

190

191

192

193
194

Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (“The basis of the immunity given to communications
between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of
justice which the privilege entails. . . . Communications between the spouses, privately made, are
generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged; but
wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under which it was made,
was obviously not intended to be confidential it is not a privileged communication.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51–52 (1980) (recognizing the
distinction between the privilege protecting spousal communications and rights regarding the
spousal testimonial privilege in trials and eventually concluding that the witness spouse alone holds
the testimonial privilege and may waive it in order to testify adversely to his or her spouse).
People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43, 44 (N.Y. 1973) (noting that New York was the first state to
statutorily recognize the physician-client privilege, which was not recognized at common law,
because the privilege “protect[s] those who are required to consult physicians from the disclosure
of secrets imparted to them, to protect the relationship of patient and physician and to prevent
physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or
disgrace to patients” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Steinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
188 N.E. 152, 153 (N.Y. 1933))).
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (“Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.’”
(quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51)).
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (“The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose
to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”).
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (noting that the purpose of
recognizing a privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, is based in the desire that important,
“relevant information” is shared between the parties).
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (discussing the multiple types of privileges and value each provides to
the one sharing information in confidence).
See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
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Courts have widened the cadre of third-party confidants recognized by
the attorney-client privilege even further to include members of the so-called
“magic circle.”195 Common law courts recognized as long ago as the
eighteenth century that there are certain third parties—like interpreters—
who are crucial to the provision of legal advice.196 If disclosure to these third
parties breached confidentiality and resulted in privilege waiver, the
attorney-client privilege itself would be compromised. Accordingly, courts
hold that members of this magic circle do not count as third parties for
privilege waiver purposes.197 Today, members of the magic circle include
language translators,198 data analysts,199 executive assistants,200 IT support,201
photocopy services,202 necessary subject matter experts,203 and the like. The
magic circle is a circle of confidence.
Even divulging attorney-client communications to third parties outside
of the magic circle and other privileged relationships will not necessarily
result in waiver. The cornerstone of the privilege-waiver analysis is the intent
of parties and the reasonableness of their precaution to preserve
195

196
197

198

199

200

201

202

203

United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The privilege, it is said, is
designed to protect confidentiality, so that any disclosure outside the magic circle is inconsistent
with the privilege.”).
Du Barré v. Livette (1791) 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97; Peake 108, 110–11.
See, e.g., Clay v. Williams, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 105, 122 (1811) (acknowledging that a privilege based
on confidentiality between an attorney and his client extends “even to interpreters going between
the attorney and his client”).
See, e.g., Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 240 F.R.D. 96, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting
that communications with an attorney through an interpreter are protected by the attorney-client
privilege as an exception to the principle that communications in the presence of a third party
destroy confidentiality).
See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1114 (D. Kan. 2006) (holding
that an adverse impact analysis by an analyst was protected by the attorney-client privilege because
the analysis data was gathered at the direction of counsel and the communications were made for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice).
See, e.g., City & Cty. of S.F. v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (noting that the
attorney-client privilege extends to employees such as “the attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk
regarding information of communications between attorney and client acquired in such capacities”).
See, e.g., Compulit v. Banctec, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 410, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding “that a law
firm does not waive its client’s privilege by contracting with an independent contractor” who
provides computer-assisted litigation support when it is done “to provide a necessary service that
the law firm feels it needs in order to effectively represent its clients”).
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he attorney-client privilege [would not] be lost if a law firm used an outside
document copy service or hired an independent document copy service to copy privileged
communications.”).
Symposium, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the
Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 22–
23 (1990) (explaining the circumstances in which courts extend the attorney-client privilege to
experts because those experts do not have a recognized privilege or the circumstances prevent the
privilege from otherwise applying).
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confidentiality.204 Where the disclosure is inadvertent, “the relevant
consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the confidentiality
of the documents as manifested in the precautions they took.”205
Accordingly, courts ask whether the party claiming the privilege “took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and, upon discovering it, “promptly
took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”206 A typical sort of case involves
parties who inadvertently produce privileged documents in response to a
discovery request.207 Courts will inquire into the steps the party took before
disclosure—e.g., conducting pre-production privilege review of the
documents—and after—e.g., promptly requesting return of the documents
upon learning of a mistake.208
Some waiver cases specifically address the knowing disclosure of
attorney-client communications to third-parties who are not the direct
recipients of the information, but merely aide its transmission. These cases
are most analogous to the central concern of this Article—how third-party
service providers affect privacy under the Fourth Amendment. In the
privilege context, these third parties facilitate, have access to, store, or
monitor communications that include attorney-client communications, such
as cell-service providers, internet service providers, or employer-provided
email systems.209 Courts have adapted the centuries-old law of attorneyclient privilege to modern contexts and technologies.210 The underlying
204

205
206
207

208
209

210

See Rice, supra note 178, at 853–55 (“In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege, whether
employed in state or federal courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the other in
confidence, and subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained.” (footnotes omitted)).
Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that privileged tapes
were inadvertently shared during discovery); Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs.
Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the inadvertent disclosure in question
occurred during accelerated discovery proceedings).
See Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc., 91 F.R.D. at 260–61.
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability of Privileges to Employees’ Personal E-mails: The Errors
Caused by the Confusion Between Privilege Confidentiality and Other Notions of Privacy, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (discussing the status of the law regarding the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to emails that are subject to employer monitoring); Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to
Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH.
1, 29 (2011) (explaining how internet activity tracking conducted by websites, advertisers, and
internet service providers may lead courts to find waiver of the privilege in some cases); Timothy
Peterson, Cloudy with a Chance of Waiver: How Cloud Computing Complicates the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 383, 396 (2012) (discussing how the law has not yet established rules
governing attorney-client privilege and confidentiality and new technologies such as cloud
computing, leading to risks of privileged material being disclosed to non-privileged third parties).
See JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS, CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION § 2.08 (1999) (“[M]any important issues currently at the center of the privilege
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doctrinal and normative framework of the attorney-client privilege has
shown itself to be more adaptable than the much more recent privacy
doctrines of the Fourth Amendment.
Once again, standards of reasonableness govern whether clients waive
privilege by using third-party services to communicate with their attorneys.
Accordingly, courts assess the matter on a case-by-case basis,211 and the
balance can tip in either direction.212 In one common fact pattern, an
employee in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. used a work-issued device to
send messages to her attorney over a private email account.213 The device
utilized a program that captured a picture of every website the employee
visited, and the employer had a device policy in place that granted it access
to any records on its computers.214 The central concern for the court was
whether the employee had a “reasonable expectation” of confidentiality in
the emails despite the employer’s software and policy.215 The court balanced
the employer’s access against several specific facts, including that the
employee used her personal email account, over a web-based platform, and
without storing her password on the device.216 These steps, in addition to

211
212

213
214
215

216

discussion concern new technology.”); Mitchel L. Winick et al., Playing I Spy with Client Confidences:
Confidentiality, Privilege and Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2000)
(“[E]ach modern technological advance has taken attorneys and their clients one step farther from
the closed-door, personal interactions upon which the privilege was founded. Accordingly, with
each step, the legal profession has been confronted with challenges to the privilege.” (footnote
omitted) (citing Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation
and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 331 (1998))).
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987).
See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 81 A.3d 278, 287 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Numerous
courts have applied the Asia Global factors or closely similar variants when analyzing the attorneyclient privilege [waiver claims premised on the use of unencrypted email]. Several of the Asia Global
factors have been refined through subsequent application. In the current case, the Asia Global
factors weigh in favor of production.”); Imwinkelried, supra note 209, at 10 (discussing the factors
that determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies); see also Kara R. Williams, Protecting
What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer
Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 356–58 (2008) (outlining different jurisdictions’
evaluation of attorney-client privilege and e-mails over employer-owned e-mail systems). Compare
Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did attach to e-mails sent over company
system), with Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007)
(finding that the privilege did not attach to e-mails sent over the employer’s system).
990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010).
Id. at 655–57.
Id. at 660. The court uses the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy.” However, since the
conception of privacy is different from the one at play in the Fourth Amendment context, it is
clearer for present purposes to use “confidentiality,” the term more commonly associated with the
attorney-client privilege.
Id. at 663–65.
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the fact that the employer’s device policy was not clearly communicated to
employees, were sufficient to establish her expectation of confidentiality and
to preserve the privilege of her attorney communications.217
As a general rule, the use of an unencrypted, third-party email service
does not, by itself, suffice to waive attorney-client privilege.218 In In re Asia
Global Crossing, a leading case on the matter, officers of a bankrupt
corporation used the corporate e-mail system to communicate with their
personal attorneys about their claims against their employer.219 The
corporate trustees argued that the officers had waived their privilege on
several grounds: e-mail carries an inherent risk of disclosure, the e-mail
system was owned and run by the corporation, and the system policy
prohibited its use for confidential communications.220 Following the stance
of the American Bar Association and some state bar associations,221 the court
held that “lawyers and clients may communicate confidential information
through unencrypted e-mail with a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality.”222 But, the court did acknowledge that some uses of
employer email could result in waiver. It said that four main factors bear on
the analysis:
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the employee’s
computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to the computer
or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the
employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?223

The Asia Global court applied the factors and found “the use of the company's
e-mail system d[id] not, without more, destroy the privilege.”224 Other courts
have relied on the Asia Global factors to guide their waiver inquiry.225
The general rule is that clients can maintain their reasonable expectation
of confidentiality, even when they know third-party facilitators may be
217
218

219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id. at 664–65.
In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he transmission of
a privileged communication through unencrypted e-mail does not, without more, destroy the
privilege.”).
Id.
Id. at 259–60.
Micah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to
Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 295 (2006).
Asia Glob. Crossing, 322 B.R. at 256.
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 251.
See, e.g., Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 2:11-CV-03577-RDP, 2016 WL 7745029, at
*5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2016); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-2509-LHK-PSG,
2013 WL 772668, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013); In re Reserve Fund Secs. & Derivative Litig.,
275 F.R.D. 154, 159–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

520

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:2

looking on, by taking “affirmative steps to maintain the confidentiality of the
attorney-client communications.”226 If the client does not take these steps,
waiver will result. In Harleysville Insurance Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., the
court held that posting case files and communications to an online storage
system without sufficient precautions to prevent access by a third party
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.227 Attorneys had posted
the information to a file sharing site for use by Harleysville’s attorneys.228 In
the course of explaining its decision, the court noted some easy precautions
the attorneys could have taken to prevent waiver, such as password
protecting the files229 or safeguarding the access link.230 As it was, the client
had done “the cyber world equivalent of leaving [a] claims file on a bench in
the public square and telling its counsel where they could find it.”231
Interestingly, courts that have analyzed privilege waiver in the context of
third-party electronic service providers—like email and cloud storage—focus
on the possibility of waiver due to access by yet other third parties—like
employers or opposing counsel. The third-party service providers usually
seem to recede into the background, like people in other privileged
relationships with the client or the “magic circle” that is necessary for
facilitating attorney-client communication. This cannot be because courts
are only concerned with whether opposing parties could access the
communications. Unlike the work-product protection,232 disclosure to any
third party potentially waives attorney-client privilege if the disclosure calls
the confidentiality of the communication into question.233 Rather, it must be
because courts do not regard the use of such service providers, which most
226
227
228
229
230
231

232

233

Geer v. Gilman Corp., No. 3:06 CV 889(JBA), 2007 WL 1423752, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2007).
Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15cv00057, 2017 WL 1041600, at *9
(W.D. Va. Feb. 9), overruled in part by 2017 WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9. The magistrate judge’s opinion in Harleyesville was eventually reversed by the reviewing district
court judge. Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home Inc., 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617,
at *19 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (finding reasonable precautions were taken in part because files
uploaded to cloud server were accessible only using a randomly generated URL that was not
discoverable using Google or other web search engines). The contrasting opinions on the case illustrate
both how judges will sometimes find that precautions to preserve confidentiality against third-party
service providers are insufficient, and also how low the bar to preserve confidentiality can be.
See In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 165 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that disclosure to a third party
waives the attorney-client privilege, but the work product privilege is only waived if disclosure is to
an adversary). The work-product protection is a weaker privilege. See United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (stating that the work-product privilege is “not absolute”). It applies only to
documents prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 238.
Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 165.
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attorneys and clients need to communicate at all, to be inherently
inconsistent with the confidentiality of those communications.
In sum, the notion of privacy courts use in the context of the attorneyclient privilege reflects an intuitive understanding of privacy as a form of
confidentiality. “Confidence” has its roots in the Middle French and Latin
words meaning “trust.”234
Confidence and trust have a different
informational logic than the sort of secrecy which is the current lynchpin of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Like secrecy, confidentiality can be lost
when third parties get involved. Sharing information with third parties can
signal that it is not shared under conditions of mutual trust. But unlike
secrets, confidential information does not necessarily become less
confidential when shared. One can have a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality with another person; but there is something paradoxical about
insisting what you tell another is truly secret. To determine whether
attorney-client communications remain confidential despite disclosure to
third parties, courts ask whether the client had subjective and objective
expectations of confidentiality. The latter is measured by whether the client
took reasonable precautions to maintain the confidential nature of the
communication.
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Privacy is at the heart of Fourth Amendment law. There are multiple,
overlapping ways to understand what privacy is. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the common law of attorney-client privilege offer
competing conceptions. Both recognize that sharing information can
compromise its privacy. However, under the Fourth Amendment’s
understanding of privacy-as-secrecy, the fact that information has been
shared is usually dispositive of its lost privacy. Privacy-as-confidentiality in
the law of attorney-client-privilege is more nuanced—with appropriate
precautions, information can remain confidential even if third parties have
access to it.
The Supreme Court should abandon its understanding of privacy as a
type of secrecy and import the common law understanding of privacy-asconfidentiality. This would allow the Court to strike a more appropriate
balance between the interests of investigating authorities and the interests of
the people in their personal data. Thinking of privacy-as-confidentiality
under the Fourth Amendment would soften the force of the third-party
doctrine where third-party service providers are involved. Under current
234

See Confide, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (T.F. Hoad ed., 1996).
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law, the Fourth Amendment does not protect what is quickly becoming the
bulk of our intimate information because third-party service providers—like
cell companies and ISPs—have access to it. Thinking of privacy as
confidentiality could change this. The move should be easy for the Court to
make since the attorney-client privilege is backed by centuries of judicial
refinement and application to a wide range of cases. It should also not
require a large shift in core Fourth Amendment jurisprudence outside of the
third-party service provider context. Secret information is by its nature also
confidential. So key Fourth Amendment rights would remain in place.
These rights would just extend under this proposal in a more sensible way to
a modern world held together by third parties.
Most of the Justices in Carpenter, in both the majority and dissent, were
searching for conceptual tools to convey that “a third party [having] access
or possession of your papers and effects does not necessarily eliminate your
interest in them.”235 Doing this by shifting to a conception of privacy as
confidentiality has several distinct advantages over the proposal they hit
upon. The majority’s solution—carving seven-day blocks of cell-site location
information out for special treatment—is an ad hoc solution. As Justice
Gorsuch asks, “[W]hat distinguishes historical data from real-time data, or
seven days of a single person’s data from a download of everyone’s data over
some indefinite period of time?”236 Justice Kennedy felt similarly, referring
to the “arbitrary 6-day cutoff.”237
In addition to being ad hoc, the majority’s approach does not go far
enough to explain why “[j]ust because you entrust your data . . . to a third
party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its
contents.”238 Justice Gorsuch makes the intuitive point:
Suppose I entrust a friend with a letter and he promises to keep it secret until
he delivers it to an intended recipient. In what sense have I agreed to bear
the risk that he will turn around, break his promise, and spill its contents to
someone else? More confusing still, what have I done to manifest my
willingness to accept the risk that the government will pry the document
from my friend and read it without his consent?239

The precedent established by the Carpenter majority does not protect Fourth
Amendment interests in any other information people reveal to third party
235

236
237
238
239

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2221
(majority opinion) (“[T]hird parties . . . [hold] records in which the suspect has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”)
Id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 2263 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
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service providers, like six-day blocks of location information, emails,
genomes, photos, etc. Conceiving of privacy as confidentiality would.
To the extent the majority means for its opinion to reach beyond sevenday blocks of cell-site location information,240 it provides very uncertain
guidance. The Court says the distinctive properties of cell-site location
information deserve Fourth Amendment protection, but fail to say clearly
what those distinctive properties are.241 Justice Kennedy predicts that the
“newly conceived constitutional standard will cause confusion” among lower
courts and enforcement personnel.242 In his view, the Court has effectively
set up an unprincipled “balancing test . . . . [that just asks when] privacy
interests are weighty enough to ‘overcome’ the third-party disclosure.”243
Without more guidance on how, if at all, to extend the Carpenter precedent to
different types of information, Justice Kennedy must be right. The solution
proposed here is different. Since it draws on centuries of attorney-privilege
precedent, it offers a more robust framework for assessing a broad range of
information types and contexts.
The next two Sections describe in more detail what the Fourth
Amendment inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy-asconfidentiality would look like.
A. An Open-Textured Inquiry
On the approach proposed here, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement protects personal information when, and only when, a person
has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in it. As under current Fourth
Amendment244 and attorney-client privilege245 case law, the confidentiality
inquiry would have both subjective and objective components. What follows
explores these components where third-party service providers are involved.
Though not a focus of the discussion, the considerations raised below could
extend to other sorts of third parties, including natural persons.

240
241
242
243
244
245

Id. at 2214 (majority opinion) (“[W]e reject[ ] . . . a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
Id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court maintains, cell-site records are ‘unique’ . . . .
But many other kinds of business records [are similar]. . . .”).
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2231–32.
See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
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1. Subjective Expectation
Courts should first ask whether a person claiming Fourth Amendment
protections had a subjective expectation that her information was and would
be kept confidential. As under current Fourth Amendment law, this could
mean that the person actually thought that the information was and would
be kept secret.246 But a subjective expectation of confidentiality could remain
even where the person has voluntarily shared it with a third party and so
knows the information is not secret. These sorts of cases could potentially
fall into three categories, all of them recognized by privilege law.
First, the person may feel she is in a relationship of trust with the third party.
Mutual trust is crucial to the analysis in attorney-client privilege contexts
where third parties are involved.247 People trust those with whom they are
in confidential relationships not to disclose their information in ways that
would disadvantage them. This does not necessarily mean that people expect
their trusted third parties to keep their information secret. Sometimes, as
with an attorney’s magic circle, the third party must disclose the information
to fourth and fifth parties for the ultimate benefit of the person whose
information it is. This is an expected feature of confidential (as opposed to
secretive) relationships. However, a subjective expectation of confidentiality
could not exist where the information holder believes there is some likelihood
the third party (e.g., an attorney or a service provider) may expose the
information to her disadvantage (e.g., to her adversary or to government
investigators without a warrant).
Courts have formally recognized that some sorts of relationships are
presumptively confidential in this way, like the spousal relationship or the
confessional relationship.248 But subjective expectations of trust and
confidentiality can extend beyond these. People may even feel that they have
such relationships with corporate third-party service providers.249 Indeed
such companies often invest a lot into cultivating customer trust and

246

247

248
249

See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that monitoring a person’s home
with thermal imaging technology was a search under the Fourth Amendment because the
defendant had a reasonably expectation of privacy, secrecy, in his conduct in his own home).
See Mark J. Kadish, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Can It Stand Its Ground Against New Government Intrusions?,
36 EMORY L.J. 793, 793 (1987) (describing mutual trust as one of the cornerstones of the attorneyclient privilege).
See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that in many
circumstances, the fact that an internet service provider has control over and access to emails is
alone insufficient to eliminate a person’s expectation of privacy in those emails).
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reputations for discretion.250 Facebook offers “privacy” settings, which can
make us feel that they respect the confidentiality of the personal information
we protect using them.251 Apple publicly resists federal government pressure
to unlock the iPhones of criminal suspects252 in an effort to give the
impression that the company respects privacy.253 Whether it is reasonable
for customers to buy into these marketing campaigns is a separate question.
That customers frequently do is clear from companies’ continued
investment.
Second, a person may have a subjective expectation of confidentiality
while utilizing a third-party service provider because she may not know that the
third-party service provider has access to her information. Third-party service
providers design their products to minimize our awareness that at each
moment they are collecting, storing, and processing our information.254
They do this in part because they want clean information about our habits
and preferences, and people who feel they are being observed modify their
behavior.255 The information from our web searches, product purchases,
geolocation, etc., is less valuable to advertisers when it is not authentic.256 So
250

251
252

253
254

255

256

See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 8 (2013) (“Firms invest in reputation so that customers will
do business with them. Rational customers prefer to do business with companies with good
reputations because a strong reputation for honesty and integrity serves as a sort of bond, or credible
promise to customers that the business will not act in a dishonest or immoral way. . . . [A]ccording
to the traditional economic theory of reputation, simple cost-benefit analysis predicts that
companies will invest in reputation because doing so enables them to attract customers who will
pay a premium to deal with the company with the good reputation.”).
See Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242
(last visited Dec. 2, 2018).
See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San Bernardino
Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/
69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html.
Id. (reporting that Apple refused to create a “backdoor” to its iPhone’s programming because of the
threat it posed to all its customers’ devices in the future).
See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433,
1434–35 (“[W]e adore Google for its simple, modest-looking interface masking a hypercomplicated algorithm. We admire it for providing superb services at no (evident) cost . . . . [But]
[e]very day, millions of users provide Google with unfettered access to their interests, needs, desires,
fears, pleasures, and intentions. Many users do not realize that this information is logged and
maintained in a form which can facilitate their identification.”).
See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting, 2
BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412 (2006) (reporting that people contributed nearly three times as much
money to a coffee room honesty box when a picture of eyes was present on a nearby wall than when
a picture without eyes was on the wall).
See Natasha Singer, Your Online Attention, Bought in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/technology/your-online-attention-bought-in-an-instant-
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third-party service providers try to make us feel that we truly are by ourselves
when we are on our smartphones late at night.257 As discussed above, there
are in fact any number of trackers operating behind the scenes watching our
digital trails.258 As courts have repeatedly held in the attorney-client privilege
context, a person who is not aware that others are accessing her information
can have no reason to doubt its confidentiality.259
The third sort of case is subtler—where a person knows she is sharing
information with a third-party service provider, even one she does not trust,
but believes it is practically certain that the information is not identifiable as her personal
information. This is a safety-in-numbers sort of rationale. In many
circumstances, customers will have agreed to let third-party service providers
access and use their information, even though they do not necessarily feel
that they are in a relationship of trust with the company. By clicking “I
Agree” before installing a smartphone app, downloading a new browser, or
signing up for internet service, customers usually grant the service provider
access to their information.260 Sometimes people do not read or understand

257

258
259

260

by-advertisers.html (discussing how online advertising has moved away from traditional forms of
“spray and pray” advertising to using complex algorithms that instantly analyze an internet user’s
search and website history and instantaneously sell advertising space targeted at the specific
searcher).
See generally Hidden Brain: What Our Google Searches Reveal About Who We Really Are, NPR (May 1, 2017,
9:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/01/526399881/what-our-google-searches-revealabout-who-we-really-are.
See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
See Sackman v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that attorney-client
privilege was “not waived through public disclosure of a stolen privileged document”); see also In re
Fattah, 802 F.3d 516, 530 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the government had to revise its search process
of an email account in order to protect communications falling under the attorney-client privilege
even though the emails were being provided directly from a third-party service provider); Curto v.
Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2006) (holding that attorney-client privilege was not waived when an employer recovered
emails from a company computer that was used at the employee’s home because the employee had
a reasonable expectation that personal communications on that computer were not monitored).
See James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 15 (2005) (“Many [companies] voluntarily publish privacy policies, but there is no law requiring
privacy policies or prescribing their content.” (footnote omitted)). There are both federal and state
laws that require a company to post a privacy policy in certain circumstances, but no general law
requiring a policy in every circumstance. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a) (2012) (requiring websites
directed at children to “[p]rovide notice on the website or online service of what information it
collects from children, how it uses such information, and its disclosure practices for such
information”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(a)–22578 (West 2014) (requiring operators of
commercial websites or online services that collect personal information about individual
consumers residing in California who use or visit its commercial website or online service to
“conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site”).

Dec. 2018]

PRIVILEGING PRIVACY

527

the policies they are agreeing to.261 These scenarios would be examples of
the second type of case.
Sometimes, though, people do read privacy policies, fully understand
them, click “I Agree,” and still retain a subjective expectation of
confidentiality. The most obvious sorts of cases would be where the thirdparty service actually requires this information to function. People have to
disclose their location to use mapping services like Google Maps. Though
they share this sort of information with third-party service providers, they
could believe that their information will be used consistently with its
confidentiality. Third-party service providers often emphasize that the data
they collect is anonymous, stripped of any personally identifying
information.262 People reading such policies often feel that their anonymous
data will be just so many bits in a sea of bytes for millions of other accounts.263
The customer may feel practically certain that neither the third-party service
provider nor anyone else with access to her information would have the
ability to collect her data and tie it specifically to her. Practical certainty is
261

262

263

Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN
ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007) (“[M]ost studies show that, while consumers are increasingly concerned
about the privacy of their personal information, they are still not likely to read—much less
understand—online privacy policies.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting
that the defendant company included a message that said, “HEY GROWN-UPS: We don’t collect
ANY personal information about your kids. Which means we couldn’t share it even if we wanted
to!” on the registration form for a website designed for children).
See Simon Hill, How Much Do Online Advertisers Really Know About You? We Asked an Expert, DIGITAL
TRENDS (June 27, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/how-doadvertisers-track-you-online-we-found-out (“We know that companies are collecting data about us,
but there’s very little transparency in terms of the techniques they use, and there are a lot of
misconceptions. [People] don’t really know exactly what data [online trackers] are collecting, or
what they might use it for.”); Special Report: Getting to Know You, ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-onlineavidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party (“As more information is attached to cookies and
devices, it becomes easier to identify users, says Ed Felten, a professor of computer science at
Princeton University. Mr[.] Felten and others have shown that, given enough information,
anonymous data sets can be de-anonymised. One study found that it took only two data points to
identify more than half the users. ‘The idea of personally identifiable information not being
identifiable is completely laughable in computer-science circles,’ says Jonathan Mayer, a Stanford
University computer-science researcher.”); Manoush Zomorodi, Do You Know How Much Private
Information You Give Away Every Day?, TIME (Mar. 29, 2017), http://time.com/4673602/termsservice-privacy-security (describing the “privacy paradox,” in which most people say they care
deeply about the privacy of their information yet continue to freely give it and allow it to be tracked
online because they see no clear future consequences of giving up the information or figure that
algorithms cannot do as much as they actually can); see also Tene, supra note 254, at 1435 (“Every
day, millions of users provide Google with unfettered access to their interests, needs, desires, fears,
pleasures, and intentions. Many users do not realize that this information is logged and maintained
in a form which can facilitate their identification.”).
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not full certainty, but it may be enough for maintaining a subjective
expectation of confidentiality.
If someone shredded an attorney-client communication and cast the
pieces to the wind, courts would find this consistent with maintaining a
subjective expectation of confidentiality, despite the remote possibility that
another person may collect the bits and reconstruct the communique.264
Courts have held that a subjective expectation of confidentiality can survive
much lower levels of certainty. For example, an employee sending email
over a company device may have a subjective expectation of confidentiality
despite explicit company policy to the contrary if the company’s practices
“‘lull[ed]’ employees into believing that the policy would not be enforced.”265
Where the third party is an email provider rather than an employer, courts
are even more likely to find the messages could have been sent with a
subjective expectation of confidentiality,266 despite the risk of exposure.
2. Objective Reasonableness
The three sorts of cases just considered only bear on whether a person
can have a subjective expectation of confidentiality when interacting with a
third-party service provider. Assuming the court finds she does, it should
next ask whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. The Supreme
Court currently takes a more or less categorical approach to assessing
whether expectations of privacy are reasonable. The third-party doctrine
categorically excludes any reasonable expectation of privacy in information
shared with third parties. In the absence of a third-party issue, the Court
recognizes categories of information over which people’s expectations of
privacy are presumptively reasonable, such as information contained in

264

265
266

See McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 168 (D. Md. 1998) (suggesting that
shredding privileged documents, as opposed to solely discarding them, would maintain the
documents’ confidentiality).
Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
See Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20,
2007) (contrasting employer monitoring with email client monitoring); see also United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails
sent through AOL because AOL had strict privacy guidelines under which it would only disclose a
client’s emails to a third party if required by court order).
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private residences,267 hotel rooms,268 many areas of commercial premises,269
and private areas in public places such as restrooms and fitting rooms.270
Assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy-asconfidentiality calls for a more fact-intensive, open-textured inquiry. This is
usually how reasonableness judgments are supposed to work.271 It is the sort
of inquiry that courts making privilege-waiver determinations use.272 The
basic issue is not whether the information fits into some predetermined
category or whether it has been shared. Rather, the underlying issue is
whether the person claiming the privilege took reasonable steps, in light of
the nature of the information and the circumstances, to preserve
confidentiality. This requires courts to engage in a subtle balancing of the
facts in any particular case to reach an all-things-considered judgment.
When third-party service providers are involved, courts assessing Fourth
Amendment protections would first have to determine what level of attention
to preserving confidentiality the circumstances called for. Some features of
the circumstance would call for higher levels of care and others may call for
lower. It would be impossible to list all possible considerations ex ante, but
attorney-client privilege case law provides some representative factors.
Courts have held that the following circumstances suggest that more care is
needed to preserve confidentiality where third-party service providers are
concerned:

267

268
269

270

271

272

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth Amendment, and the personal
rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (“[A] guest in a hotel room is entitled to
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence,
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the
decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by warrant.”).
See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Minn. 1970) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a public restroom because, referencing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), “the
facilities provided assure the user of privacy as much as a telephone booth does”).
See Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that the test for
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “is inevitably a fact-intensive inquiry”); Jason M.
Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2014) (explaining how
questions in law often come to questions of reasonableness and that questions of reasonableness are
fact-intensive).
See, e.g., Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996) (adopting in a case regarding
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications a test that looks to the reasonableness of the
precautions undertaken by the privilege holder to prevent a loss of confidentiality in the privileged
documents).
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Electronic service monitoring policies, especially for employerprovided services;273
Using devices provided by third parties, especially through
employers;274
Ability of a device on its own to inadvertently disclose
communications;275
Whether communications travel through public as opposed to
private routes;276
The number and types of individuals who have access to
information that is stored with a third-party service provider;277
and
Whether the third-party service is a sharing service.278

See In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (adopting a four-part
test that focuses primarily on questions regarding the extent to which the party providing an
internet-based service has adopted policies regarding the privacy of those who use its service).
See, e.g., Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
20, 2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when a plaintiff used an employer-provided
email account on an employer-provided laptop).
See, e.g., Huff v. Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a reasonable expectation of
privacy in communications over a cell phone was lost when the confidential information was
conveyed inadvertently through a “pocket-dial”). “In sum, a person who knowingly operates a
device that is capable of inadvertently exposing his conversations to third-party listeners and fails
to take simple precautions to prevent such exposure does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to statements that are exposed to an outsider by the inadvertent operation of
that device.” Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that emails sent through
AOL carried a higher expectation of privacy than messages sent in other ways over the internet
because the AOL emails were transferred through and stored on AOL’s servers and databases as
opposed to passing through normal internet servers).
See, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 914 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that although emails
with an attorney were sent over a private email account, the fact that the plaintiff’s children knew
the password to her account and frequently used the account for their own purposes removed her
expectation of privacy). But see Geer v. Gilman Corp., No. 3:06 CV 889(JBA), 2007 WL 1423752,
at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2007) (noting that although the plaintiff used her fiancé’s computer and
email account to communicate with her attorney, the relationship between them was sufficiently
close and analogous to an agency relationship that confidentiality was not waived).
See, e.g., United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy to a file that was shared); see also Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral
Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at *7 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (finding that
reasonable precautions had been undertaken, despite the fact that the information was stored on a
cloud sharing service and had been inadvertently disclosed).
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These factors should be balanced against others that have been held to
lower the level of required care:
• Non-enforcement or unclear presentation of monitoring
policies;279
• Presence of user-controlled privacy settings;280
• Ability to set passwords on private services;281 and
• Contractual obligations of privacy between customer and thirdparty service provider.282
After the court has considered the circumstantial factors bearing on the
level of care needed to preserve a reasonable expectation of confidentiality,
it would assess whether the person with an interest in the information took
appropriate steps. Once again, attorney-client privilege case law suggests
representative steps that a person could take in the presence of third-party
service providers to preserve the confidentiality of their information:
• Using and not disclosing passwords;283
• Adjusting privacy settings;284
• Using private services as opposed to those provided by another
party, such as an employer;285

279

280
281

282
283

284

285

See Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (evaluating whether an existing monitoring policy was being truly enforced
in determining whether confidentiality existed); In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the company neither announced nor effectuated a policy of email
monitoring or announcing that emails over a company email belonged to the company); Nat’l Econ.
Research Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug.
3, 2006) (affirming that attorney-client privilege existed despite an employer policy regarding
monitoring because the policy did not expressly state that messages sent over the internet through
personal email accounts on an employer-provided computer would be saved and monitored).
See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing
the role that privacy settings play in determining an expectation of privacy).
See United States v. Nunez, No. 12 Cr. 778-2, 2013 WL 4407069, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013)
(holding that attorney-client privilege was not waived in emails sent through Gmail account because
the account was private and protected by a password that was not disclosed to third parties).
See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that AOL’s contractual
obligation of privacy with its clients created a reasonable expectation of privacy).
See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an employee
had a reasonable expectation of privacy because he locked his offices and secured his computer
with a password).
See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (remanding the question of an expectation of privacy in Facebook
wall posts to the lower court with instructions to look to the plaintiff’s privacy settings because “it
appear[ed] . . . that a review of plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the question”).
See, e.g., Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
20, 2007) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails sent on an employer-provided
laptop through personal email account, but not for confidential emails through an employerprovided email account).
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• Deleting cookies and other online tracking mechanisms;286 and
• Using encryption.287
These steps should be considered along with things a person may have
done that would undermine the reasonableness of her expectation of
confidentiality, such as:
• Storing the password in a place accessible to others;288
• Sharing passwords or accounts with others;289 and
• Failing to delete information present on devices owned by a third
party.290
The significance of any particular factor or step would be hard to predict
in the abstract. Where the circumstances indicate a high threat to
confidentiality—e.g., an email provider with a transparent policy of sharing
user data—and the steps taken to preserve privacy are weak—e.g., failing to
protect a user account with a password—the outcome under the privacy-asconfidentiality approach would likely be the same as under current Fourth
Amendment law. However, where the threat to confidentiality is weak—
e.g., an email provider with a protective privacy policy—and the steps taken
are robust—e.g., using encryption services—thinking of privacy-asconfidentiality could lead to a different result. It would allow courts to
recognize that in these cases, people still have the sorts of privacy interests
the Fourth Amendment should be protecting despite the presence of a thirdparty service provider.
Between those two poles is a wide grey space that calls for judgment in
light of specific facts. The next Section illustrates what that inquiry might
look like.

286

287
288

289

290

See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality
from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29 (2011) (“[A]n attorney might be protected against a
finding of waiver if she took reasonable precautions to avoid online research tracking, such as
adjusting the settings on her internet browser software to prevent third-party cookies, using
encryption to avoid deep packet inspection where possible, and adding software to the browser to
prevent tracking by web bugs.” (footnote omitted)).
See id.
See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 565 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (warning that leaving a password stored on another’s computer may be a factor that can lead
to losing confidentiality because it gives another access to private communications).
See, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 914 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (finding no expectation of
privacy where a password for a personal email account was shared with children who regularly
used the same account).
See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
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B. Test Case: Carpenter v. United States
Change may be in the air. The Supreme Court has signaled in Carpenter
its interest in paring back the current scope of the third-party doctrine.291
The case was on appeal from the Sixth Circuit and asked whether people
have protected Fourth Amendment interests in location data collected by cell
service providers.292 The Supreme Court made a surgical exception for such
location data when the government seeks more than seven days’ worth.293
This Article has argued that the decision did not go far enough. Conceiving
of privacy as confidentiality offers a path for reaching the same intuitively
appealing result in Carpenter while providing a theoretically justifiable
template for future applications.
Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was convicted for leading a team of fifteen
other men in several armed robberies.294 Carpenter’s role was to plan the
robberies and drive the getaway car.295 Crucial to the government’s case
against him was cell-site data the FBI had obtained from MetroPCS and TMobile, Carpenter’s wireless carriers.296 When turned on, cell phones
continuously search for and ping the nearest cell towers to route any calls.297
Wireless carriers record the time and location of the cell towers to which
individual phones connect.298 The FBI obtained the cell-site data using the
Stored Communications Act, which authorizes courts to grant orders for
telecommunications records.299 The Act requires investigators to provide
“reasonable grounds to believe that . . . [the data sought] are relevant and
material to an ongoing investigation.”300 With Carpenter’s cell-site data in
hand cataloguing nearly 13,000 location points,301 the FBI could place him
within a half-mile to two-mile distance of each of the robberies when they
291
292

293
294
295
296
297

298
299
300
301

See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that police must obtain a
warrant to access cell-site location records).
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, we hold that the
government’s collection of business records containing cell-site data was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment.”), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
Id. at 2212.
Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85.
Id. at 885.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12; see also Kristi Winner, From Historical Cell-Site Location Information to
IMSI-Catchers: Why TriggerFish Devices Do Not Trigger Fourth Amendment Protection, 68 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 243, 246–47 (2017) (arguing that cell-site location information does not protect a user’s
reasonable expectation of privacy).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12; Winner, supra note 297, at 244.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
Id.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
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occurred.302
Carpenter challenged the government’s use of the cell-site data under
the Fourth Amendment. If Fourth Amendment protections applied, the FBI
would have needed a warrant before getting the information. This would
have required a showing of “probable cause,”303 considerably more than the
“reasonable grounds” standard in the Stored Communications Act.304 The
trial court and the Sixth Circuit rejected Carpenter’s arguments. The Sixth
Circuit focused on the fact that the cell-site data contained only “routing
information”
necessary
to
“facilitate
[Carpenter’s]
personal
communications,” not the “content of those communications themselves.”305
The court’s underlying rationale was the third-party doctrine. Like envelope
information that the post office needs to deliver a letter306 or the phone
number a telephone company needs to connect a call,307 wireless providers
need location information to provide their service.
The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on a foundational third-party doctrine
case, Smith v. Maryland.308 Smith held that, since the petitioner “voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business,” he
could have no expectation of its privacy.309 The Sixth Circuit reasoned
analogously that Carpenter voluntarily exposed his location information to
third-party wireless carriers. Consequently, under the present understanding
of privacy as a kind of secrecy, Carpenter could have no reasonable
expectation of the information’s privacy.310
The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Carpenter feels incongruous with the
Fourth Amendment’s underlying concern for privacy. Carpenter’s location
may not have been secret—his wireless providers knew it. Yet it could reveal
many things about him that are intuitively private—the therapist he sees, the
302
303
304

305
306
307
308
309
310

United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“That showing [required under the Stored Communications Act]
falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant.”); Erik E. Hawkins, No Warrants Shall
Issue but upon Probable Cause: The Impact of the Stored Communications Act on Privacy Expectations, 4 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 257, 257 (2014) (stating that the Stored Communications Act allows the
government to obtain personal information at “a lower standard than probable cause”).
Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
See id.; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (“[F]or the same reasons that Smith had no expectation of privacy in the
numerical information at issue there, the defendants have no such expectation in the locational
information here.”).
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lovers he has, the faith he professes, the entertainment he prefers, etc.311
Judge Stranch saw this, but her hands were tied by the third-party doctrine
and the Supreme Court’s understanding of privacy-as-secrecy.
As we know, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit decision by
making an arbitrary exception to the third-party doctrine for seven-day
blocks of cell-site data. It might have reached the same result—the officers
investigating Carpenter needed a warrant—in a more principled way were
Fourth Amendment privacy construed as confidentiality. The questions for
the Court would have been whether, despite sharing his location information
with his wireless carriers, Carpenter nonetheless maintained a subjective and
reasonable expectation that the information was confidential. There can be
no question of this for secrecy—a shared secret is no longer secret. For
confidentiality, though, the matter is not so categorical. A court would have
to consider in detail factual circumstances that might undermine an
expectation of confidentiality and responsive conduct that may have
maintained it.
The first issue is whether Carpenter had a subjective expectation of
confidentiality. The fact that his phone shared his cell-site data with his
wireless carriers certainly cuts against Carpenter, but not decisively. Recall
that there are three sorts of cases where a person may maintain a subjective
expectation of confidentiality despite sharing information with a third
party—she is in a relationship of trust with the third party, she does not know
she is sharing the information, or she believes that the information will be
used in a way that respects its confidentiality. Since the case record is
insufficient to assess fully whether Carpenter fell in any of these categories,
what follows is some informed guesswork.
From the available record, there would not seem to be any basis for
Carpenter to claim that he was in a relationship of trust with his wireless
carriers. Absent some specific trust-inducing language in the carriers’
privacy policy, that would be a tough argument to make since trust does not
generally seem to be an aspect of relationships with wireless carriers. The
specifics of the marketing materials Carpenter saw and of his interactions
with in-store sales agents may affect the mix of facts in his favor. These may
311

Margaret E. Twomey, Note, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard for the Fourth
Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 401, 411 (2015) (“Patterns
and more personal information can be identified from the combination of such extensive
information revealing such personal details as frequently visited houses of religion, multiple trips to
the headquarters of a political party, or regular visits to a lover’s house—information the court held
should be protected by a warrant.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
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have projected the impression that the companies were to be trusted. We do
not have access to the nature of the marketing strategies MetroPCS and TMobile used toward Carpenter, but third-party service providers frequently
claim to respect customer privacy.312
The more straightforward claim for Carpenter could be that he simply
did not know that he was sharing his location information.313 The wireless
contracts Carpenter signed with MetroPCS and T-Mobile no doubt
referenced their use of location information, but Carpenter may not have
read them. Indeed, if he had read the contracts, he would have been in the
distinct minority of wireless subscribers.314 As it stands, there was not even
any evidence that Carpenter was literate—in Detroit, where Carpenter’s
exploits took place, half of adults are functionally illiterate.315
The Sixth Circuit’s argument was that “any cellphone user who has seen
her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know that . . . her phone ‘exposes’
its location to the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates
the tower.”316 There are several gaps in that short chain of reasoning.
• “Any user who has seen her phone’s signal fluctuate . . .” There was no
evidence that Carpenter did see his cell signal strength fluctuate.
He operated in Detroit, where coverage maps for MetroPCS

312

313

314

315

316

Our Privacy Commitments, AT&T, http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy (last visited Mar. 8,
2018) (“We will protect your privacy and keep your personal information safe.”); Privacy Policy
Summary, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/privacy-policy-summary (last visited
Mar. 8, 2018) (“At Verizon, we are committed to maintaining strong and meaningful privacy
protections for customers.”).
A similar argument could be made under current Fourth Amendment law. The third-party
doctrine applies only where a person “voluntarily” shares information with third parties. John B.
Wefing & John G. Miles, Jr., Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party
Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 211 (1974) (discussing the voluntariness requirement of the
third-party doctrine). A person who does not know she is sharing, does not do so voluntarily. See
C.L. Ten, Paternalism and Levels of Knowledge: A Comment on Rainbolt, 3 BIOETHICS 135, 135–36 (1989)
(discussing how insufficient knowledge precludes voluntary decisions and actions). But, as shown
in the paragraphs that follow, courts applying the simplistic understanding of privacy-as-secrecy
seem unprepared to engage in the careful factual analysis that voluntariness actually requires.
Thinking in terms of privacy-as-confidentiality could put courts in the mindset to give the question
the level of attention it requires.
See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
15, 2017, 7:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-ofservice-without-reading-2017-11 (discussing research that ninety-one percent of people agree to
terms of service without actually reading them).
Nearly Half of Detroit’s Adults are Functionally Illiterate, Report Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2011,
12:58
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/07/detroit-illiteracy-nearly-halfeducation_n_858307.html.
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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and T-Mobile show solid blocks of strong service.317 Even if his
signal did fluctuate between full strength and something slightly
less, there was no evidence Carpenter would have noticed that—
the service strength symbol is small and he would likely not have
experienced much difference in service quality.
“Must know that . . . her phone ‘exposes’ its location to the nearest cell
tower.” Even if Carpenter did notice his signal strength
fluctuating at points, he may not have known that this was
because cell towers were tracking his relative proximity. It takes
some understanding of how the cell service works to appreciate
this fact. While this may be obvious to the FBI agents who
testified at Carpenter’s trial,318 most people (including the
Author just a few years ago) use their cellphones unreflectively,
trusting to the mysterious magic of technology.319 For all the
signal strength icons reveal, it could be based on how well the
phone receives a signal, not how well it is transmitting a signal; the
former would not convey anything about location back to the
towers. What is more, there are many factors that can influence
cell-signal strength even while a phone remains stationary,
including weather conditions,320 bits of aluminum foil,321 or just

Coverage Map, METROPCS, https://www.metropcs.com/coverage.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018);
Coverage Map, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/coverage/coverage-map (last visited Mar. 8,
2018).
See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885 (discussing the trial testimony of an FBI agent who was familiar with
cell network technology and described wireless carriers’ coverage).
See Matt Bishop, Technology, Training, and Transformation, 8 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 72, 72–73
(2010) (discussing how most consumers have little technical understanding of cellphones and other
modern technology).
Understanding
Wireless
Cellphone
Coverage,
FCC
(Oct.
27,
2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/understanding-wireless-telephone-coverage-areas
(“[W]ireless phone calls can be affected by severe weather . . . . ”); Duncan Graham Rowe, MobilePhone Signals Reveal Rainfall: Wobbles in Transmissions Help to Create Weather Data, NATURE (May 4,
2006), https://www.nature.com/news/2006/060501/full/news060501-10.html (“[R]ain can
affect mobile-phone transmissions . . . .”).
Bill Robertson, Science 101: Q: Why Do You Lose AM Radio Reception When You Go Under an Overpass?,
49 SCI. & CHILD. 67, 68 (2011) (“Just for kicks, wrap your cell phone in aluminum foil and try to
call it. Nada, because cell phone signals are transmitted via electromagnetic waves.”). This fact
has led to the rise of a niche market for “Faraday bags” for knowledgeable, privacy sensitive
individuals who want to prevent wireless carrier snooping.
See, e.g., FARADAY BAG,
http://faradaybag.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
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touching the wrong spot on a phone’s casing.322 None of these
has to do with a user’s location.
• “And thus [exposes her location] to the company that operates the tower.”
Supposing Carpenter knew that his phone connects to the
nearest cell towers, he still may not have known that the tower
communicated this information in any way to his wireless
carriers. People interact with third-party products all the time
even though those products convey nothing about customers to
the companies that own them. When someone passes through
a third-party automatic barrier gate, the gate will not in most
instances communicate who passed through the gate or when.
If mounted with license plate scanners and connected to a
network, it might, but most gates function fine without this
hardware. The court record did not indicate whether the cell
towers need to communicate with MetroPCS and T-Mobile to
function, or whether knowledge of this necessity is widespread.
There are certainly some third-party service providers who
claim not to access, or even to be able to access, the information
that their customers convey using the company hardware and
software.323 The Sixth Circuit suggested that Carpenter did not
turn over the contents of his communications to his wireless
carriers, even though these would have passed through the cell
towers too.324 Why should Carpenter be presumed to know that
his cell-site location data was any different?
So, again depending on the specific facts, there would have been room
for Carpenter to argue that he had a subjective expectation of confidentiality
over his cell-site data because he trusted his wireless carriers and/or did not
know his phone was sending this information to them. Carpenter could
separately have argued that he expected them to use the information in ways
consistent with the data’s confidentiality. The record does not contain the
actual service agreement that Carpenter signed with MetroPCS or TMobile. Reviewing the present privacy policies of these companies at the
time of writing this Article is telling. They are far from transparent. TMobile gives the initial impression that the companies make temporary use
of location data, and only for internal purposes. The agreement specifically
322
323
324

See Miguel Helft, On New iPhone, a Mystery of Dropped Calls, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/technology/25apple.html.
Your Benefits with Boxcryptor, BOXCRYPTOR, https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2018) (offering “[z]ero knowledge encryption”).
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885–90 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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mentions location data: “We may use information about your location to
provide our services or to customize data presented to you.”325 A
straightforward reading of this phrase would suggest that these are the only
uses to which that information would be put.326 It is only by clicking on a
further link, and reading through blocks of longer text in much smaller font
that one finds that T-Mobile “may disclose, without your consent, the
approximate location of a wireless device to a governmental entity or law
enforcement when . . . served with lawful process.”327 As Justice Gorsuch
noted, “Consenting to give a third party access to private papers . . . is not
the same things as consenting to a search of those papers by the government.”328
Carpenter, had he casually read the privacy policy, could reasonably claim
surprise that T-Mobile shared his location information with further parties
in the absence of a warrant.
Similarly, he could claim surprise that T-Mobile stored and recorded his
location data. Using data for a limited and temporary purpose is more
consistent with expectations of confidentiality than storing the information
for later use. T-Mobile’s privacy policy provides that the company “retain[s]
information collected about [customers] for only as long as [the company]
need[s] such information for business, legal, or tax purposes.”329 While TMobile could claim to “need” Carpenter’s location data to route his calls, it
is far from clear, and the record does not disclose, any further business, legal,
or tax necessity for long-term records of the data. There may have been
some business advantage to retaining the information, but “need” conveys
something stronger and more limited.
If Carpenter could have established that he had a subjective expectation
of confidentiality, he would then have had to persuade the court that his
expectation was reasonable. The Sixth Circuit, thinking of privacy-assecrecy, seemed of the categorical opinion that Carpenter’s “conduct was not
and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy” of his location.330
The analysis in terms of confidentiality would be much more nuanced. As
in the privilege context, the court would have to balance factual
325

326

327
328
329
330

T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, T-MOBILE (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.tmobile.com/company/website/privacypolicy.aspx
(last
visited
Feb.
28,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/8KQQ-F9YY].
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 107 (2012) (explaining the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which stands for the idea
that an affirmative statement makes a negative implication of its contrapositive).
T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, supra note 325.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2263 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, supra note 325 (emphasis added).
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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circumstances that potentially undermine confidentiality with steps
Carpenter took to preserve it. The main fact that Carpenter would have had
to overcome to establish the reasonableness of his expectation is his formal
agreement to his wireless carriers’ privacy policies. These no doubt reflected
that the companies would collect, could share, and might store his location
information. In the absence of taking any steps to preserve confidentiality,
this may be enough to defeat the reasonableness of Carpenter’s expectation.
Importantly, though, there are steps Carpenter could have taken to preserve
his reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
The record does not reflect any precautionary steps Carpenter took.
Under present understandings of the third-party doctrine, this is
unsurprising—such details would not have been relevant anyway. The case
law on privilege suggests several steps that could have been relevant:
• Turning off his phone except when needed. This would have
prevented his phone from “pinging” nearby towers when it was
not in use.
• Using a Faraday bag. This would have had the same effect as
turning off his phone by cutting any communication between
the phone and cell towers.
• Turning off his GPS. Cell-site location data is much less
accurate than GPS.331
• Leaving his phone at home when possible.
• Password protecting his phone. This would have secured any
location data stored on his phone from third parties who might
try to access it.
• Using multiple phones and wireless carriers. This would have
prevented any single source from having a consistent record of
his location data.
• Using a location spoofer. These are apps that can scramble a
phone’s GPS location.332
• Updating phone and app settings so they did not store location
records.
Of course, none of these steps, alone or in combination, could have
guaranteed that Carpenter’s location data would have remained confidential.
That is not the question.333 Rather, the courts should be asking whether,
331
332
333

See id. at 889 (discussing that, while GPS devices can be accurate within fifty feet, cell-site location merely
identifies a wedge that ranges between one-half mile and two miles across that a cellphone is in).
See Nathan J. Buchok, Plotting a Course for GPS Evidence, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2010)
(discussing how a “spoofer” is able to deceive a GPS device about the spoofer’s location).
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[K]nowing about a risk doesn’t mean you
assume responsibility for it.”).
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given the necessity of cell phones to modern life, the way cell phones work,
and the details of the privacy policy Carpenter signed, any steps he did take
were reasonably calculated to justify an expectation of confidentiality. Just
as courts assessing privilege find that there are steps employees can take to
justify reasonable expectations of confidentiality in emails they send from
employer monitored devices, there will be some steps that in combination
could suffice in Carpenter’s circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes replacing the Supreme Court’s current
understanding of Fourth Amendment privacy. The concept usually goes
undefined in the case law. The Court’s development of the third-party
doctrine—that privacy is generally lost when information is shared with third
parties—reveals that its implicit understanding of privacy is as a type of
secrecy. Thinking of privacy as secrecy is too restrictive in the modern world,
where we must rely on third parties for our ordinary social and economic
lives. A different area of privacy law—attorney-client privilege—is more
adaptable and has already responded to the current state of technology. In
privilege law, the relevant notion is privacy as a sort of confidentiality. Unlike
secrets, confidential information can be shared with third parties, and still
remain confidential with the right precautions.
If the Court drew on the developed common law of privacy-asconfidentiality, it would have the tools to respect the Fourth Amendment
interests people have in personal communications that require the assistance
of third-party service providers. When determining whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality in information shared with thirdparty service providers, a court’s central questions would be:
1. Did the person have a subjective expectation that the third-party
service provider would keep the information confidential?
2. Was that expectation reasonable? That is to say, in light of the
circumstances, did the person take appropriate steps to preserve the
confidentiality of the information?
Both of these questions call for case-specific inquiries, balancing features of
the circumstance that may have called for caution, and the cautious steps
taken in response. Courts assessing claims of attorney-client privilege have
been answering these questions for cell phones, text messages, emails, and
the like for decades. Their collective wisdom would be a powerful resource
for courts assessing confidentiality in the context of the Fourth Amendment
in the modern age.
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As with any standard, the fact-specific balancing required to assess
reasonable expectations of confidentiality will introduce some measure of
unpredictability into the process.334 This is undeniably a cost for suspects,
judicial administration, and police departments trying to ascertain whether
a search requires a warrant.335 It is a cost that pervades much of the Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis.336 The present proposal would extend this
uncertainty to the present predictability of third party cases. This a systemic
issue that courts evaluating searches have to grapple with. At least so far as
the present proposal is concerned, there some reason for relative optimism.
Courts have a very long history and a good track record of assessing
reasonable expectations of confidentiality in the privilege context. This longstanding jurisprudcence would be an aid to suspects, courts, and police
navigating the early stages of Fourth Amendment confidentiality
jurisprudence. Enforcement authorities with sufficiently well-founded
suspicions can always secure a warrant and the assurances it brings.
These uncertainty costs of moving from privacy-as-secrecy to privacy-asconfidentiality should not be trivialized. However, where the options are
between a rule that systematically undermines Fourth Amendment interests
and a less efficient standard that has a chance of protecting them, the costs
are easier to justify. Marginal inefficiencies in the courtroom and the police
station are a small cost to pay for guarding our basic civil liberties. This is
what thinking of privacy as confidentiality promises to do.
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